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Theory of Mind Measurements and Mechanisms:  
An Investigation of Construct Validity and Cognitive Processes in Theory of Mind Tasks  
by 
Ester Navarro Garcia 
Claremont Graduate University: 2021 
Understanding the perspectives of others is a critical skill. Theory of mind (ToM) is an 
essential ability for social competence and communication, and it is necessary for understanding 
behaviors that differ from our own (Premack and Woodruff, 1978). Although all individuals 
possess a ToM to varying degrees, bilinguals are especially adept to perspective-taking. Research 
has reported that bilinguals outperform monolinguals in ToM tasks (e.g., Goetz, 2003; Rubio-
Fernandez & Glucksberg, 2012). However, the mechanisms underlying this effect are unclear. 
Studying individual differences in ToM performance between bilinguals and monolinguals can 
help explain these mechanisms. Yet this promising area of research faces an important challenge: 
the lack of psychometric research on ToM measurement. Recent research suggests that tests that 
measure the ToM construct might not be as reliable as previously thought (Warnell & Redcay, 
2019). This hinders the interpretation of experimental and correlational findings and puts into 
question the validity of the ToM construct. This dissertation addresses these two questions 
empirically to improve our understanding of what constitutes ToM. Study 1 examines the 
structure of ToM, crystallized intelligence (Gc), and fluid intelligence (Gf) to understand (a) 
whether ToM constitutes a construct separate from other cognitive abilities and (b) to explore 
whether tasks of ToM present adequate construct validity. For this, three confirmatory factor 
analyses (CFAs) were conducted. The results demonstrated that a model with three latent factors 
 
(ToM, Gf and Gc) did not adequately fit the data and was not significantly different from a 
model with only two latent factors (ToM-Gf and Gc). In addition, an exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) showed that two of the ToM tasks loaded onto a Gf factor whereas one of the tasks loaded 
onto a third factor by itself. Finally, an exploratory network analysis (NMA) was conducted to 
observe relationships among the tasks. The results showed that the ToM tasks were no more 
related to each other than to some tasks of Gf and Gc, and that ToM tasks did not form a 
consistent cluster. Overall, the results of Study 1 suggest that ToM tasks are likely not measuring 
a monolithic ToM construct. Study 2 examines individual differences in metalinguistic 
awareness, executive function, and bilingualism as predictors of ToM. The results showed that 
all variables significantly predicted ToM, but bilingualism was not a significant moderator of 
ToM. Overall, the findings suggest that in this sample there was no difference in the processes 
used to predict ToM based on being bilingual or monolingual. Implications for measurement and 
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I. Introduction to Theory of Mind  
1. The Conceptualization of Theory of Mind 
How do humans understand how other people feel and what they believe? Psychologists 
and philosophers have long asked this basic question (see Wellman, 2017). Theory of mind 
(ToM) is the ability to understand the beliefs, knowledge, and intentions of others based on their 
behavior. The term was first coined by Premack and Woodruff (1978) to refer to chimpanzees’ 
ability to infer human goals, and it was quickly adopted by psychologists to study humans’ 
ability to infer and predict the behavior of others. This was followed by a vast number of studies 
on the topic. A simple search of the term “theory of mind” on PsycInfo reveals over 7000 articles 
and 1000 books on Theory of Mind. This is not surprising given that ToM is necessary for 
numerous complex cognitive tasks, including communication (e.g., Grice, 1989; Sperber & 
Wilson, 1995), criticism (Cutting & Dunn, 2002), deception (Sodian, 1991), joking and lying 
(Hughes & Leekam, 2004; Leekam & Prior, 1994), irony (Happé, 1994), pragmatic language 
competence (Eisenmajer & Prior, 1991), aggressive behavior (Happé & Frith, 1996), and 
problem solving (Greenberg, Bellana, & Bialystok, 2013). In addition, ToM has been observed 
across cultures and countries (Avis & Harris, 2016; Lee, Olson, & Torrance, 1999; Naito, 
Komatsu, & Fuke, 1994; Tardif & Wellman, 2000) and impaired ToM has been linked to 
psychiatric and developmental disorders, such as schizophrenia and autism spectrum disorder in 
both adults and children (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985, 1986; Frith, 2004; Hughes & 
Russell, 1993). 
However, despite the numerous findings related to ToM (see Schaafsma et al., 2015), it is 
still unclear what the processes underlying ToM are. This might be partly due to the various 
operational definitions of the term ToM. For example, behavioral and neuroimaging research 
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usually distinguishes between language-independent implicit ToM (i.e., fast, automatic ToM) 
and culture and language-dependent explicit ToM (i.e., slower, deliberative ToM) (Apperly & 
Butterfill, 2009; Heyes & Frith, 2014; van Overwalle & Vandekerckhove, 2013). Other 
researchers instead distinguish between ToM as an emergent property based on experience and 
context and a latent ability that is expressed as the result of its interaction with general cognitive 
processes, such as working memory and executive function (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992, 1994, 
2012; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998; Leslie, 1994). There are also differences between cognitive 
compared to affective ToM (Abu-Akel & Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Poletti et al., 2012) and 
empathic ToM compared to representing the mental states of others (Preston & de Waal, 2002; 
Bernhardt, & Singer, 2012; van Veluw & Chance, 2014). Moreover, some researchers consider 
ToM in the realm of cognitive development while others refer to adult social cognition; more 
generally, some conceptions of ToM consider it the ability to understand the self as opposed to 
others, while other conceptions refer to ToM as empathic and emotional reactions. This wide 
variety of conceptual definitions suggests that the overarching concept of ToM as it is used by 
researchers in several fields likely entails a number of different processes and dimensions that 
represent different dimensions of a ToM ability (Schaafsma et al., 2005; Quesque & Rossetti, 
2020). Thus, ToM research faces several challenges that need to be addressed to advance the 
field. 
One consequence of the conceptual confusion around ToM research is that it hinders the 
creation of valid tests. That is, because the description of the processes underling ToM is 
confusing, it is difficult to find tests that adequately measure the processes that form ToM. The 
variety of terminology and the creation of a wide number of ToM measures with poor 
psychometric properties have contributed to the problem. Recent research shows that many of 
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the measures commonly used to assess ToM likely assess different processes (Warnell & 
Redcay, 2019), and it is unclear whether all of these processes really tap into an overarching 
ToM ability or whether they are tapping different lower-level processes (Quesque & Rossetti, 
2020). In fact, there has been strong criticism of the way ToM is investigated and conceptually 
defined for a number of years (Bloom & German, 2000; Frith & Happé, 1994), yet the problem 
continues. Thus, one of the main goals of the field should be to address the lack of psychometric 
validity of ToM measures. 
Another consequence of the conceptual confusion around ToM research is the lack of 
understanding of the processes involved in ToM. In particular, due to inconsistent terminology, 
instead of examining a general ToM ability, many studies have examined diverse subconstructs 
that might not completely represent the ToM ability. Schaafsma et al. (2015) suggested that one 
solution to the terminology issue is to not treat ToM as a “monolithic” ability (i.e., as an 
indivisible construct). Instead, researchers should consider the flexible nature of the construct 
when proposing theories that account for the processes that likely engage ToM. For example, 
Wellman (2018) proposed that one way to understand these processes is to examine populations 
that exhibit different ToM behaviors because of different individual experiences. Individual 
differences can help inform variation in achieving ToM milestones. For example, ToM seems to 
develop differently based on experience, such as different language ability (Milligan, Astington, 
& Dack, 2007), having knowledge of mental state words (Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002), 
having siblings, and growing up bilingual (Wellman, 2018). Regarding bilingualism, researchers 
have found that bilinguals on average complete ToM tasks at an earlier age than monolinguals 
(see Schroeder, 2019, for a meta-analysis). Thus, one goal of the field should be to address how 
various individual experiences including being bilingual impact ToM processes. 
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The current studies focus on two aspects of ToM. The first study examines the 
psychometric properties of current ToM measurements. The goal is to understand (a) the extent 
to which researchers are measuring adequately the ToM construct and (b) the measures that 
should be used, revised or abandoned by examining the tasks that load on a ToM construct, as 
opposed to other related but different constructs (i.e., verbal ability). This study is expected to 
shed light on whether ToM constitutes a coherent psychometric construct. The second study 
focuses on ToM research on bilinguals as a means of understanding whether ToM performance 
variation is the result of bilinguals engaging different processes than monolinguals. Specifically, 
the goal is to assess whether ToM performance can be predicted by different cognitive 
mechanisms for bilinguals than for monolinguals. Ultimately, the goal of the current research is 
to expand ToM theoretical frameworks by examining the extent to which the processes engaged 
in ToM vary based on individual differences. 
1. Psychometric and Measurement Issues in ToM Research 
Numerous psychometric tasks and tests have been created to measure ToM. The first task 
created to assess ToM was the false-belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). This task could not 
have existed if it were not for the help of the philosophers who created the perspective-taking 
paradigm (Bennett, 2019; Dennett, 1978; Pylyshyn, 1978), inspiring Wimmer and Perner (1983). 
The wealth of ToM research that has followed Wimmer and Perner’s study has led to the 
creation of a number of tasks and tests that assess different aspects of ToM. Some of the 
processes that these tasks measure include false belief understanding (Berstein, Thornton, & 
Sommerville, 2010; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), accounting for others’ perspectives (Dumontheil, 
Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010), the ability to infer mental states from the expression of people’s 
eyes (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
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Spong, Scahill, & Lawson, 2001), detection of faux pas (e.g., Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, 
Jones, & Plaisted, 1999), deceptive intentions (e.g., Sebanz & Shiffrar, 2009), understanding 
others’ thoughts (Keysar, 1994), and the difference between Level 1 perspective-taking (i.e., 
understanding that others’ line of sight differs) and Level 2 perspective-taking (i.e., mentally 
adopting someone else’s point of view) (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956; Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, 
Andrews, & Bodley Scott, 2010), among countless others. 
 Despite the fast proliferation of ToM tasks, appropriate psychometric assessments of the 
validity of existing ToM measures have only recently been studied, with results suggesting 
concerns about the underlying structure being measured. Specifically, Warnell and Redcay 
(2019) examined coherence among ToM tasks using a psychometric approach. The researchers 
examined the relationship among different ToM measures (including the false belief task, the 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes test, and pragmatic language comprehension, among others) in 
child and adult populations. They found that an exploratory factor analysis did not support a 
clear structure underlying a ToM factor for the adult group. In addition, even though factor 
analysis was not possible due to low sample size for the child sample, correlations among the 
tasks administered to children also revealed poor correlations. These findings suggest that the 
measures used to assess ToM do not adequately tap into a reliable construct. The results of this 
study are consistent with recent theoretical accounts proposing that ToM is not likely a single 
construct, but that instead is a composite of both social and cognitive abilities (e.g., Apperly, 
2012; Gerrans & Stone, 2008; Schaafsma et al., 2015). However, an earlier meta-analysis by 
Baker, Peterson, Pulos, and Kirkland (2014) found that the correlations among ToM tasks were 
generally higher than those found by Warnell and Redcay (2019). Therefore, further research is 
needed to understand whether measures typically used to assess ToM are indeed adequately 
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measuring the same underlying construct. Thus, it is critical to clarify what measures of ToM 
should be used, revised, or abandoned. 
A first attempt to clarify ToM tasks was performed by Quesque and Rossetti (2020). The 
researchers conducted a systematic review of a large ToM task battery to assess the face validity 
of over 20 measures of ToM used by researchers from a variety of areas, including 
developmental, clinical, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. They concluded that 
there were large differences in the underlying cognitive mechanisms that each of the tasks 
seemed to measure, including perspective-taking, eye tracking, and inference making. 
Importantly, they suggested that a paradigm shift in the methodologies traditionally used to 
explore social cognition are necessary to ensure terminological clarity and to advance the field. 
For this reason, they called for the need to identify and classify the measures that correctly assess 
ToM compared to others that likely only measure lower-order cognitive processes, such as 
kinematic processing (like automatic eye gaze movement; Obhi, 2012), social attention (Heyes, 
2014) or emotion recognition (Oakley et al., 2016). Specifically, the researchers concluded that 
many of the tasks were likely measuring lower-order social-cognitive processes like those above, 
rather than a higher-order ToM ability, such as inhibiting one’s perspective, creating models of 
alternative emotional responses, and updating one’s own knowledge.  
Further, Quesque and Rossetti (2020) emphasized the need for enforcing strict criteria for 
the use of ToM tasks. Specifically, they propose that any task that is used to assess ToM should 
meet two essential criteria: mentalizing and nonemerging. Mentalizing refers to whether success 
in a given task necessitates understanding others’ mental states or whether it could be attributed 
to lower-order cognitive processes instead. For example, understanding emotion from people’s 
eyes (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001) might not actually tap into 
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higher-order processes required to understand how other people feel, but instead might be the 
result of lower-order perceptual responses. Nonemerging refers to whether a given task requires 
representing the mental state of another person when that mental state differs from the 
participant’s mental state. Following the previous example, understanding the emotion expressed 
by somebody’s eyes does not require that the participant inhibits their own emotion. That is, if 
the emotion in somebody’s eyes represents anger, participants do not need to inhibit what they 
are feeling to realize it is anger. Higher-order ToM requires both understanding of others’ mental 
states and the ability to inhibit one’s own. Quesque and Rossetti (2020) argued that numerous 
tasks created and implemented to date do not meet both of these criteria and are therefore not 
measuring ToM. 
Despite the apparent lack of construct validity across tasks, many studies have used ToM 
tasks to examine the relationship between ToM and other cognitive abilities. Specifically, 
research has shown that ToM is related to verbal ability and executive function (EF) (e.g., 
German & Hehman, 2006; Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007), leading many researchers to 
suggest that ToM performance requires the development of the processes underlying these 
abilities. However, given the poor correlations among tasks of ToM, it is unclear why the 
relationship between ToM and other cognitive abilities emerges. In fact, it is possible that the 
relationship among cognitive abilities, such as verbal ability and EF, is the result of ToM tasks 
that share processes with tasks of EF and verbal ability, rather than reflecting a relationship 
among constructs. Unsurprisingly, many of the ToM tasks used in the literature have components 
that, at face value, share processes with constructs commonly studied in the cognitive abilities 
research literature, such as crystalized and fluid intelligence. Therefore, to understand the 
construct validity of ToM measures, the relationship among ToM tasks and other cognitive 
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constructs should be examined. This would help elucidate the tasks that measure a specific ToM 
ability, and the tasks that measure other related, but different, cognitive abilities. 
More specifically, the ToM research literature has largely overlooked the possible 
relationship between tasks of ToM and tasks of specific sub-abilities that constitute general 
intelligence. For over one hundred years, intelligence researchers have studied the ways in which 
people develop, use, and differ in cognitive abilities (for a review, see Kovacs & Conway, 2016). 
This long tradition emanates from research using cognitive test scores to extract a single common 
factor, g, representing general intelligence (Spearman, 1904, 1927). g is thought to be the result of 
the positive manifold, that is, the largely replicated finding that cognitive abilities are consistently 
positively correlated. For this reason, many researchers have traditionally interpreted g as the 
common cause underlying individual differences in task performance and the covariance among 
different measures (Gottfredson, 1997). Early intelligence research has shown that general 
intelligence is related to various specific abilities.  
One of the earliest models of intelligence was the fluid/crystallized (Gf/Gc) model of 
intelligence (Cattell, 1963, 1971; Horn, 1994). The Gf/Gc model proposed that general intelligence 
was the result of two specific and opposite abilities: Gf or fluid intelligence and Gc or crystallized 
intelligence. Gf was defined as the ability to solve problems in novel situations, regardless of 
previous knowledge and Gc was defined as the ability to solve problems using previously acquired 
skills, largely related to the amount of formal schooling one has been exposed to (Kan, Kievit, 
Dolan, & van der Maas, 2011). These two abilities have been expanded and incorporated into more 
recent models of intelligence, including the Cattell–Horn–Carroll (CHC) model (McGrew, 2009), 
which combines the Gf/Gc model with other specific abilities, such as visual-spatial (Gv), 
processing speed (Gr) and memory retrieval (Gr). Importantly, Gf and Gc remain two of the 
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strongest factors in models of intelligence and have been replicated consistently across the 
literature and across neuroscientific and developmental studies. 
While ToM has been related broadly to IQ, usually measured as school achievement (Baker 
et al., 2014; Coyle, Elpers, Gonzalez, Freeman, and Baggio, 2018; Dodell-Feder et al., 2013; 
Navarro, Goring, & Conway, 2021), it has not been psychometrically compared to specific 
measures of Gf and Gc. Gf and Gc represent two correlated but different dimensions of 
intelligence and several reliable tasks are used to measure each construct. It is important to 
understand whether the correlation between ToM and cognitive abilities is due to share variance 
among tasks that measure independent but related constructs, or whether, instead, existing tasks of 
ToM do not in fact measure a ToM construct but rather other cognitive abilities. 
2. Current Theoretical Frameworks of ToM 
Despite the methodological issues of ToM research, numerous theoretical approaches 
have been proposed to explain the processes underlying this ability. Specifically, ToM was first 
studied from a philosophical perspective, or “philosophy of mind” (Pylyshyn, 1978) that 
attempted to explain how people were able to “read” other people’s minds (Davies & Stone, 
1995). Unfortunately, philosophy of mind accounts were rarely empirically tested, forcing 
experimental psychologists to disengage from early theories (Apperly, 2010, p.5). 
Empirically supported theories of ToM can be classified according to two features, 
namely (a) whether they describe ToM in terms of domain-general vs. domain-specific 
processes, and (b) whether they view ToM as a subset of cognitive “modules” (i.e., theoretical 
specialized compartments). Theories within (a) fall in the so-called Competence-Performance 
framework (Scholl & Leslie, 2001; Wellman et al., 2001); theories within (b) focus on describing 
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the presence of one or more related or unrelated modules (in which ToM’s sub-abilities are 
divided) that form the ToM ability.  
i. Competence framework  
 Gopnik and Wellman (1994)’s theory-theory is the main theory within the Competence 
framework. The theory-theory takes its name from the idea that children behave like “little 
scientists” (Gopnik, 1996a, p. 486) who create theories of people’s intentions and revise those 
theories as new evidence emerges. The theory-theory proposed that ToM is an ability that 
emerges in childhood as a result of experience. Accordingly, children have a basic ToM (i.e., 
“folk psychology”) to infer the mental states of others and they use it to naturally construct 
theories that explain the world around them. When children fail to reach a goal because they 
have not considered others’ mental states, they adjust their theory accordingly. Therefore, 
children learn that individuals hold different mental states and that mental states can vary as a 
result of experience (Gopnik, Meltzoff, & Kuhl, 2000). This trial and error approach allows 
children to “realize” (i.e., through a conceptual change) that people have different mental states 
(Wellman & Liu, 2004). That is, children first have a “mentalistic” psychological theory based 
on non-representational states (e.g., desires and perceptions) and gradually develop a mental 
representational theory of other people’s mental states (Flavell & Miller, 1998; Gopnik & 
Wellman, 1994; Perner, 1991). 
However, the theory-theory assumed that this change occurs in childhood and therefore 
cannot explain findings showing that older children and adolescents sometimes make ToM errors 
if the difficulty of the task is age-appropriate (Miller, 2010), indicating that the older the 
individual the more complex the mental state can be. These led researchers to explore whether 
ToM was influenced by cognitive abilities that develop during childhood. Specifically, numerous 
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studies have found a relationship between EF and ToM, leading researchers to conclude that 
older children might require the use of more challenging tasks because EF increases with age. 
Many researchers propose that the strong relationship between EF and ToM (e.g., German & 
Hehman, 2006) and the fact that changes in ToM and EF seem to occur at about the same 
developmental stage (Carlson, 2005; Garon, Bryson, & Smith, 2008) indicate that ToM and EF 
are likely related (Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Carlson, Moses, & Claxton, 2004; German & 
Hehman, 2006; Perner, Lang, & Kloo, 2002; Hala, Hug & Henderson, 2003).  
ii. Performance framework 
To address the EF-ToM relationship, several theories have emerged within what is 
known as the Performance Framework. Specifically, Expression, Emergence, and Cognitive 
Complexity and Control-Revised (CCCR) performance theories attempt to describe how ToM 
develops by explaining how this development is affected by EF. All these theories have in 
common that they consider EF to be an essential aspect of ToM but differ in the specific role that 
EF plays in ToM use and development. 
a. Expression 
Expression theories suggest that an existing latent ToM is “activated” by EF and 
therefore can only be used when complex EF begins to develop. Leslie and collaborators (Leslie, 
1994; Leslie, German, & Polizzi, 2005; Leslie & Polizzi, 1998) proposed the ToM mechanism 
(ToM-M), in which ToM was formed by a dual-component model, with a largely innate domain-
specific ToM mechanism responsible for representing beliefs and desires, and a domain-general 
“selection processor” that develops gradually throughout the lifespan and allows interference 
resolution  of conflicting perspectives via EF. Clearly influenced by nativist language production 
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theories (e.g., Chomsky’s Language Acquisition Device, 1960), Leslie’s theory suggests that a 
ToM system is in place from birth, but this system cannot be “expressed” until EF skills are 
available to control it (see also Carlson, & Moses, 1998). Thus, according to this theory, EF 
allows the “expression” of a latent ToM ability. 
b. Emergence  
Emergence theories suggest that EF allows the creation of an otherwise non-existing 
ToM, unlike Expression theory that proposes that ToM is an innate ability. Moses (2001) 
proposed that using EF (e.g., top-down self-control) makes understanding other people’s mental 
states possible, even if they conflict with one’s own mental states. Thus, EF processes can be 
abstracted to other contexts, evolving into an independent ToM mechanism that would otherwise 
not exist (Moses, 2001; Russell, 1996). A different twist of the Emergence theory proposes that, 
instead, developing ToM is what allows the development of EF (Perner, Lang, and Kloo, 2002). 
However, since temporal precedence cannot be established, this view of Emergence theory has 
not gained popularity. 
c. CCCR 
Finally, Zelazo, Muller, Frye, and Marcovitch (2003) proposed the Cognitive Complexity 
and Control-Revised (CCCR) theory. This theory suggests that both abilities, ToM and EF, are 
sub-abilities caused by an overarching general ability to reason about and attend to hierarchical 
rules. Specifically, Zelazo et al. (2003) propose that age-related changes in EF are the result of 
changes in the complexity of the rules that children can simultaneously use to solve a given task. 
According to this view, children solve coordinated conditional rules (“if I go to the store today, 
then I will buy milk, otherwise I’ll drink juice”) by reflecting on the rules these statements 
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represent, thus comparing them to other rules and embedding them under higher order rules. In 
this example, the conditional statement about the store is dependent on the completion of another 
event (today). As children age, this general rule-solving ability increases. Thus, CCCR theory 
proposes that both EF and ToM are byproducts of children’s ability to follow and decide to 
follow hierarchical rules. 
Most of the ToM theories can fit within the Competence-Performance frameworks. 
Nevertheless, more recent theories have focus on describing ToM from a different perspective. 
These theories can be considered parallel to the Competence-Performance frameworks; the main 
difference is that their focus is on describing the structure of ToM from a neurobiological 
perspective, while the Competence-Performance frameworks attempt to explain ToM from a 
developmental perspective. For this reason, more recent accounts are rooted in neuroimaging 
research and describe possible neural areas that contribute to ToM. At least four accounts about 
ToM have been proposed based on this evidence.  
First, Gerrans and Stone (2008) proposed that ToM could be the result of sub-
components that focus on different aspects of perspective-taking; more specifically, they 
proposed an overarching domain-specific ToM module (influenced by multiple low-level 
domain-specific social processes) and an overarching domain-general module (that interacts with 
domain-specific processes). This account attempts to explain ToM by describing the interrelated 
nature of ToM, EF, and contextual cues for resolution of domain-general and specific 
components of ToM. Second, Apperly (2012) proposed an account to unify ToM and the 
cognitive tasks used to measure it. This theory attempted to provide a better account of the 
psychometric structures emerging from ToM measurement. According to this account, ToM does 
not just constitute a specific construct as it was originally proposed, but instead spans multiple 
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cognitive abilities in an interactive way. Similarly, the account by Schaafsma et al. (2015) 
proposed that various independent domain-specific low-level processes (e.g., eye gaze, intention 
tracking) form a ToM construct, instead of having a single-module general ToM. In other words, 
Schaafsma et al.’s theory claims that ToM is formed by domain-general processes that explain 
relationships among tasks, but also have domain-specific components that are not accounted for 
by general processes. Some evidence from the last two accounts comes from neuroimaging 
studies showing that ToM is likely not just a single construct (Frith & Frith, 2003; Schurz, 
Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & Perner, 2014). Instead, despite general agreement over some of the 
areas engaged when responding to ToM tasks (i.e., ToM network), recent meta-analytic work has 
found that distinct activation profiles are found when examining separate tasks (as opposed to 
aggregated tasks) in a brain activation map (Van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009), suggesting that 
some areas are engaged more often when responding to some ToM tasks, but not others. In 
addition, brain activation patterns seem to also vary throughout the lifespan, with responses to 
ToM tasks starting off more diffused in early childhood and becoming more concentrated in 
adulthood (Bowman, Liu, Meltzoff, & Wellman, 2012; Bowman & Wellman, 2014). This 
evidence indicates that ToM is likely composed of different processes and can change 
throughout development.  
Finally, Apperly and Butterfill (2009) proposed a theory to account for developmental 
differences throughout the lifespan. Specifically, Apperly and Butterfill’s theory suggested that 
there is a two-system ToM ability that can account for both the EF-ToM relationship and 
conceptual changes based on experience or context. This dual-system view is based on classical 
dual-process theory that proposes that human cognition is defined by a distinction between 
effortless, intuitive, automatic processes (System 1) and effortful, deliberative, operational 
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processes (System 2) (De Neys, 2012; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Pennycook, 
Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015a). According to Apperly and Butterfill, in ToM System 1 is used by 
infants and young children, but also by adults when the situation does not require effortful 
processing, such as when there is no perspective conflict. System 1 thus precedes and contributes 
to System 2, a fully formed ability to comprehend other mental states that requires effortful 
processing. 
Discerning among all of these theories is difficult because by definition, they are not 
independent, and there is evidence that supports several of the claims in each model. The reason 
why they are supported is likely because each theory focuses on different aspects of ToM. Some 
theories focus on the type of processes used (general vs. specific), some focus on the properties 
of psychometric tasks, some on brain regions engaged in ToM, and yet others focus on the 
developmental aspect of ToM. Therefore, it is possible to find evidence for each of these 
separate aspects, in turn supporting different theories. A unifying theory could bring all of this 
evidence together to explain ToM better from different angles. However, obtaining a unifying 
theory that encompasses all these areas is difficult. Much evidence comes from developmental 
research that has focused on examining ToM in child populations. Therefore, to better 
understand the origin of these theories, evidence from developmental studies should be 
considered first. 
3. Developmental Evidence for the Competence and Performance 
Frameworks 
Children’s ability to understand mental states (e.g., beliefs, intentions, desires) is a 
foundational social-cognitive skill related to a variety of healthy developmental milestones, such 
as social competence, peer acceptance, and academic success (Carlson, Koenig, & Harms, 2013). 
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A vast amount of research has reported that by age 5 there are significant changes in children’s 
understanding of mental states (Harris, 2006; Wellman & Liu, 2004). For example, by the end of 
their first year, children can treat individuals as agents with intentions (e.g., desires, goals) 
(Wellman, 2018). Specifically, Brandone and Wellman (2009) found that 6 and 8-month-olds 
have longer looking times to areas where they expect a person to look for an object than to areas 
where they do not expect a person to look and Behne, Carpenter, Call, and Tomasello (2005) 
found that 9-18 month-old infants were more impatient (e.g., reaching, looking away) when an 
adult could not hand them a toy than when an adult did not want to hand them the toy; this was 
not true for 6-month-olds. This behavior indicates that infants understand basic intentions by the 
time they are 9 months, but not earlier.  
However, although children can execute many abilities that require basic perspective-
taking by the age of 2 (i.e., emotion, intention, or perception), they largely do not understand 
mental concepts like knowledge and belief. Specifically, 1- and 2-year-old children often do not 
distinguish between their knowledge and beliefs and the knowledge and beliefs of others 
(Carlson, Koenig, & Harms, 2013). This was first demonstrated by Wimmer and Perner (1983). 
In their study, the researchers administered the Sally and Anne false-belief task1 to children with 
ages ranging from 3 to 9 years of age. While most of the 5-9-year-olds provided accurate 
responses, the 3-4-year-olds did not, indicating that the ability to represent mental states of other 
 
1 The false-belief task is used to assess ToM in 2-5 year-olds (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). False belief 
understanding indicates that children comprehend (a) that agents have different intentions and knowledge, and (b) 
that thoughts can differ from objects in the real world (Wellman, 2018). The task presents two characters (e.g., Sally 
and Anne) in a child-friendly way. Children first see Sally hide an object in location A, then go away. While Sally is 
absent, Anne moves the object from location A to B. After children see the scene, they are asked whether Sally will 
first look for the object in location A or in location B. To respond correctly that Sally will look in location A, a child 
must infer that Sally does not know that the object has been moved, and therefore that she does not have the same 
knowledge and beliefs as the child. Children under 3 years of age generally fail to pass this task by answering that 
Sally will look for the object in location B, suggesting that they do not understand that mental states differ. 
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people becomes established at the ages of 4-6. Wellman Cross and Watson (2001)’s meta-
analysis of 178 false-belief studies reported consistent findings: most 3-4-year-olds do not 
respond accurately to false-belief tasks compared to older children, indicating that they largely 
do not understand the mental states of others. Overall, research to date suggests that 
understanding mental states undergoes a change at age 3-4. 
This change is largely distinguished by the difference between Level-1 and Level-2 
perspective taking. That is, infants can understand that people see things differently (Level-1 
perspective taking), even if they do not yet understand that others can think different things and 
have different perspectives (Level-2 perspective taking) (Flavell, 1974, 1977; Flavell, Everett, 
Croft, & Flavell, 1981). For example, Masangkay et al. (1974) administered a series of tasks to 
2-to-5-year-olds (e.g., picture task, turtle task) in which objects presented a different perspective 
for the experimenter and for the children. They found that 2-year-olds correctly indicated when 
the experimenter could not see an object even when the child could (Level-1), but only older 
children indicated when the experimenter could see an object from a different perspective (i.e., 
from the top as opposed to from the left) than the child (Level-1). This suggests that Level-1 
develops before Level-2. Similarly, Moll and Tomasello (2006) found that on average 24-month-
olds, but not 18-month-olds, helped an adult find an object that was visible to them but not to the 
adult (Level-1), indicating that children younger than 24 months did not exhibit Level-1 
perspective taking. 
The developmental differences between Level-1 and Level-2 perspective have been 
largely taken to support theories within the Competence framework (e.g., theory-theory; Gopnik 
& Wellman, 1994). That is, children originally have a “theory” of what other people know, but 
since they are not always correct, they experience communication errors. This forces children to 
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adjust and reconstruct their initial theory to correctly understand what other people know, intend, 
and believe. Evidence from studies comparing Level-1 and Level-2 perspective taking is thought 
to indicate that ToM can evolve and become more sophisticated as a result of interaction with the 
world. However, other findings cannot be explained solely within the Competence framework. 
Specifically, some research has shown that resolution of false-belief tasks is related to executive 
functioning (EF) performance. This was first reported by Leslie and Polizzi (1998), who 
examined responses to false belief problems that required more EF, that is, negative false beliefs 
(i.e., a false belief task where the protagonist’s desire is to avoid rather than approach a target). 
4-year-olds in the study performed worse in the negative compared to the standard false-belief 
task, suggesting that more EF was needed for the negative tasks. This was extended by Carlson 
and Moses (2001), who conducted a correlational study to examine the relationship between EF 
(i.e., inhibitory control) and ToM in a sample of preschool-age children. The researchers found 
that inhibitory control was strongly correlated with ToM performance, even after controlling for 
factors like language, age, verbal ability, and family size. Numerous developmental and 
neuroscientific replications of these findings (Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994; van der Meer, 
Groenewold, Nolen, Pijnenborg, & Aleman, 2011) have led to the conclusion that, unlike the 
Competence framework suggests, EF is a necessary factor for ToM development, and it likely 
allows the use of a complex ToM ability. Thus, research examining the relationship between EF 
and ToM provides support for theories within the Performance framework of ToM (e.g., ToMM 
theory; Leslie, 1994), that is, children can only utilize their latent ToM correctly when they 
develop EF naturally with age (i.e., when they are able to inhibit egocentric responses), but not 
before. 
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The conflict between these theoretical frameworks is known as the competence-
performance debate (Wellman et al., 2001; Scholl & Leslie, 2001). Since both frameworks make 
similar predictions about ToM (i.e., that ToM begins developing in preschool years), it has not 
been possible to discriminate among them. To decide among these theories, researchers have 
studied how individual differences affect the development of ToM (Wellman, 2018). 
Specifically, growing up bilingual seems to help children reach the milestone of passing false-
belief tasks earlier in development. Examining the reasons underlying bilinguals’ performance 
can inform research on the extent to which these opposing frameworks explain ToM.  
4. Explaining ToM mechanisms: bilingualism and ToM 
The Competence-Performance debate (Wellman et al., 2001; Scholl & Leslie, 2001) 
cannot be easily resolved by studying standard samples of healthy children because both 
frameworks make the same predictions for this cohort. That is, theories from both frameworks 
propose that ToM develops between 3 and 5 years of age due to a different underlying process 
(i.e., experience and EF, respectively). However, Wellman (2018) suggested that studying 
individual differences in reaching the ToM milestone (i.e., passing false-belief tasks) could help 
researchers understand the processes underlying ToM performance. Individual differences, such 
as engaging in social-pretend play, having siblings, or growing up bilingual (Wellman, 2018) 
have been found to affect the development of ToM. Specifically, bilingual children (i.e., children 
who grow up learning and speaking more than one language) have been shown to outperform 
monolingual children in ToM false-belief tasks (Bialystok & Senman, 2004; Carlson & Moses, 
2001; Goetz, 2003; Kovacs, 2009;) and this effect seems to be stable across tasks and not subject 
to publication bias (see Schroeder, 2019 for a meta-analysis).  
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Understanding the processes underlying bilinguals’ ToM performance could help explain 
the processes that are engaged in ToM ability. Specifically, bilinguals present differences in 
factors that influence various cognitive mechanisms. For example, metalinguistic awareness and 
vocabulary size are predictors of ToM performance (Altman, Goldstein, & Armon-Lotem, 2018; 
Diaz & Farrar, 2017). Bilinguals also show different neurological development. Specifically, 
older adults who are bilinguals present stronger cognitive and linguistic efficiency (Baum & 
Titone, 2014). Differences in bilinguals’ responses to cognitive ability tasks might reflect 
variation in the type of cognitive processes used by bilinguals as opposed to monolinguals. This 
indicates that individual differences in ToM also might be related to variation in the cognitive 
processes that bilinguals use when responding to ToM tasks. 
Two explanations have been proposed for bilinguals’ ToM performance. First, Bialystok 
and Senman (2004) proposed that bilinguals have enhanced EF as a result of constant conscious 
switching between languages (Bialystok, 1999). Specifically, Bialystok suggested that bilingual 
children have domain-general EF advantages over monolinguals on tasks that involve ambiguous 
and conflicting information thanks to their experience controlling both of their languages 
(Bialystok, 1999; Bialystok & Codd, 2000; Bialystok & Majumder, 1998; Bialystok & 
Viswanathan, 2009). Bialystok suggested that, because ToM also requires resolution of 
ambiguous and conflicting information, EF advantages might allow bilingual children to 
outperform their monolingual peers in tasks that require ToM. Thus, advantages in EF would 
increase ToM performance, supporting the Performance framework. Second, Goetz (2003) 
proposed, instead, that bilinguals’ conscious switching between languages could be the result of 
bilinguals’ awareness of the languages that people around them can and cannot speak (Kloo & 
Perner, 2003). This, in turns, could translate into improved metalinguistic awareness, that is, 
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awareness that objects and events can be represented in more than one way (Bialystok 1988, 
1992, 1999), helping bilinguals comprehend that individuals have different mental states at an 
earlier age. Studies have found that young bilingual children are able to switch to the appropriate 
language of their interlocutor (Genesee, Boivin, & Nicoladis, 1996; Genesee, Nicoladis, & 
Paradis, 1995; Lanza, 1992), suggesting that bilinguals may be more aware of the fact that other 
people have different mental states, than are monolingual children (Goetz, 2003). Thus, 
advantages in metalinguistic awareness would increase ToM performance, supporting the 
Competence framework. 
Both of these hypotheses (EF advantage and metalinguistic awareness) can potentially 
explain why bilinguals outperform monolinguals in ToM tasks and evidence for both of these 
views has been found. For example, Goetz (2003) examined ToM performance of bilingual and 
monolingual 3-4-year-olds in two temporally separate sessions. Goetz found that bilinguals 
performed better than monolinguals in most of the tasks in the first session, but the difference 
disappeared in the second session. Goetz proposed that this happened because bilinguals have 
more ToM “practice” as a result of their interactions with people who speak different languages, 
but this difference can be overcome if monolinguals practice their ToM, therefore suggesting that 
bilinguals have more ToM experience, but not enhanced EF ability.  
On the other hand, Kovacs (2009) found results that supported the opposite view. 
Specifically, she administered 3-year-old monolingual and bilingual children two false-belief 
tasks. One false-belief task was a modified language-based task (i.e., requiring metalinguistic 
abilities) and the other was a standard false-belief task (i.e., not requiring additional 
metalinguistic abilities). Kovacs hypothesized that bilinguals should perform better in the 
modified language-based task than in the standard task because the modified task depicted a 
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language-switch context that should have facilitated ToM if bilinguals indeed have improved 
ToM skills due to metalinguistic awareness. However, Kovacs found that bilingual children 
outperformed monolinguals on both tasks, not just in the modified task, suggesting that 
bilinguals’ performance is not due to a metalinguistic advantage, but instead could be due to a 
general EF advantage over monolinguals. 
These contradictory results are reflective of the theoretical debate around the processes 
underlying the ToM ability. However, the idea that bilinguals might have an “advantage” in 
either EF or metalinguistic awareness has been rejected by some researchers. Instead, more 
recent studies indicate that bilingual children could be using different processes to engage ToM 
altogether, resulting in different development throughout the lifespan. In contrast to the 
Competence-Performance debate, these studies suggest that treating metalinguistic awareness 
and EF as dichotomous processes might not adequately account for bilinguals’ performance. 
Specifically, Diaz and Farrar (2017) conducted a correlational study to examine whether 
bilinguals showed differences in the types of processes used to solve false-belief ToM tasks 
across a year. Matched children performed a false-belief task, a metalinguistic task, and an EF 
task. The researchers found that EF at time 1 largely predicted ToM performance at time 2 for 
monolinguals (but not bilinguals), while metalinguistic awareness at time 1 largely predicted 
ToM performance for bilinguals (but not monolinguals) at time 2. Similarly, Buac and 
Kaushanskaya (2019) found that EF predicted ToM performance for monolingual, but not 
bilingual, children while linguistic ability (measured using the Clinical Evaluation of Language 
Fundamentals, CELF; Wiig, Semel, & Secord, 2013 – often used to measure metalinguistic 
awareness in children) predicted ToM performance for bilingual but not monolingual children. 
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These findings suggest that instead of bilinguals having a quantitative advantage (i.e., 
bilinguals use the same cognitive processes as monolinguals, but they do so more effectively), 
bilinguals could have a qualitative advantage, that is, bilinguals and monolinguals might be 
using, to an extent, different mechanisms when completing ToM tasks with one set of 
mechanisms producing superior results. That is, bilinguals could rely on metalinguistic 
awareness to engage ToM more than other processes. By doing so, bilinguals might alleviate 
some of the cognitive load from (a) inferring the mental states of others and (b) inhibiting one’s 
own mental states, which taxes EF resources, resulting in more accurate performance. 
If the processes underlying ToM can vary based on specific individual experiences, such 
as being bilingual, then adults’ performance should reflect these variations. Although early 
studies dismissed ToM research with adults because adults have a “fully developed” ToM 
(Apperly, 2010, p.86), there is evidence that adults show individual differences in ToM 
performance (Apperly, Back, Samson, & France, 2008; Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Keysar, Lin, 
& Barr, 2003; Navarro, Macnamara, Glucksberg, & Conway, 2020). In addition, ToM develops 
gradually throughout the lifespan and becomes increasingly more accurate in adulthood 
(Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010), suggesting that the processes used to engage ToM 
development in childhood could continue to be engaged in adulthood. In fact, compared to 
adults, older children and adolescents present neurological changes in brain areas engaged when 
responding to ToM tasks (e.g., right temporo-parietal junction), suggesting that ToM is not an 
immutable ability (e.g., Saxe, Whitfield-Gabrieli, Scholz, & Pelphrey, 2009). Because there is 
some evidence that adult bilinguals might also outperform adult monolinguals on ToM tasks 
(Javor, 2016, Rubio-Fernandez & Glucksberg, 2012, Navarro & Conway, 2021), it is possible 
that, just as it has been observed in children, adult bilinguals engage different processes than 
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monolinguals to perform ToM tasks. If this is the case, then studying bilingual and monolingual 
adults could shed some light on which specific processes are involved in ToM, and which 
processes bilinguals preferentially engage. 
5. Individual Differences in ToM in Adulthood 
In recent years, there has been an increase in the amount of research examining ToM in 
adults. This is likely because ToM is relevant for a number of everyday tasks performed by 
adults, such as complex social navigation, perspective taking, and complex communication 
(Sperber & Wilson, 1995, 2002). ToM understanding is first observed when children achieve the 
ToM milestone (Wellman, 2018) at 3-4 years of age, however this ability continues to develop 
along different dimensions throughout childhood (e.g., Carpendale & Chandler, 1996) and 
adulthood (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010). In fact, ToM seems to engage multiple 
brain areas throughout development, including the medial prefrontal cortex, and the left and right 
temporoparietal junction (i.e., the ToM network). In addition, different specific regions within 
these areas are utilized at different developmental stages, reflecting the way in which ToM 
processes change (Bowman & Wellman, 2014). For example, in infancy, regions engaged in 
ToM tend to be more diffuse (i.e., more areas are activated); however, there is a gradual 
incorporation of regions in the ToM network and a shift in the type of functions used as 
development proceeds (Bowman & Wellman, 2014). This suggests that changes that occur in 
infancy could influence later development, and therefore ToM development does not necessarily 
end in early childhood. 
One example of developmental changes in ToM is reflected in research by Dumontheil, 
Apperly, and Blakemore (2010). The researchers examined participants aged 7 to 27 (divided in 
five age groups: 7-9, 10-11, 12-14, 15-17, and 19-27) on a ToM task that required taking into 
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account what a virtual avatar knew and did not know, compared to a control task where there 
was not an avatar. The researchers reported that ToM performance increased steadily with age, 
such that younger adults performed better than children and young adults performed better than 
all other groups. However, ToM errors were observed for all groups, suggesting that while ToM 
performance improves with age, since all groups presented ToM errors, ToM is still likely to be 
cognitively effortful and subject to individual differences. In addition, Dumontheil, Apperly, and 
Blakemore also found that while adults’ ToM performance was better than all other groups, they 
did not perform better than the young adult group (aged 14-17) in a task of EF. According to the 
researchers, this might suggest that while ToM and EF are related, ToM continues to develop 
even after EF plateaus (for example, as a result of exposure to daily experiences where ToM is 
necessary). According to the researchers, the disassociation between ToM and EF suggests that 
ToM also relies on cognitive processes other than EF and that the type of process engaged at a 
given moment could vary based on an individual’s cognitive “blueprint”, such as being bilingual 
(Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). 
While the specific processes that affect ToM performance in adults are unclear, research 
suggests that adults engage cognitively effortful processes to resolve ToM tasks. For example, a 
number of studies have reported that adults have egocentric biases about other people’s thoughts 
and beliefs. Specifically, adults tend to think that other people will make decisions based on what 
they know but not necessarily what other people know. Mitchell, Robinson, Isaacs and Nye 
(1996) found that when participants knew that a character’s belief was true, they judged it less 
likely that the character would change its mind than when the character’s belief was false (i.e., 
reality bias). Similarly, Birch and Bloom (2007) found that when participants knew the correct 
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location of a hidden object, they indicated that it was less likely that another person would look 
for the object in the incorrect location (i.e., the curse of knowledge).  
These egocentric tendencies on perspective-taking tasks have been found in numerous 
studies among adult populations (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Navarro, 
Macnamara, Glucksberg, & Conway, 2020; Nickerson, 1999; Royzman, Cassidy, & Baron, 
2003), suggesting that engaging ToM is cognitively demanding, and therefore likely taxes EF 
resources. However, it is not clear whether adults can engage other processes, such as 
metalinguistic awareness, when utilizing ToM. 
While an increasing number of studies have examined how task performance varies based 
on cognitive demands exerted by ToM, few studies have examined whether ToM performance in 
adult populations varies based on individual differences, just like it has been observed with 
children. The study by Diaz and Farrar (2017), described above, suggests that metalinguistic 
awareness is used to engage ToM by bilingual children, while EF seems to be more engaged by 
monolingual children. Early advances in metalinguistic awareness could influence normal ToM 
development, such that the processes engaged to use ToM early on in development could 
continue to be used throughout childhood and into adulthood, while other processes like verbal 
ability and EF might only be engaged when the task becomes more effortful. Researchers have 
considered that growing up bilingual merely helps children reach the ToM “milestone” earlier 
than monolinguals, but have not examined whether bilingualism has an impact on the processes 
engaged in ToM (Wellman, 2018). However, results of Diaz and Farrar (2017) and Buack and 
Kaushanskaya (2019) suggest that bilingual experiences can lead to using alternative processes, 
like metalinguistic awareness, to utilize ToM.  
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There is limited evidence that adult bilinguals outperform monolinguals in ToM 
performance. Rubio-Fernandez and Glucksberg (2012) found that college-age bilinguals had 
fewer eye fixations in the egocentric item of the false belief task than monolinguals, thus 
outperforming monolinguals. In addition, Rubio-Fernandez and Glucksberg found that the 
bilinguals in their study also outperformed monolinguals in the Simon task of inhibitory control. 
Finally, performance in the ToM task was correlated with performance in the Simon task for 
both groups. This led the researchers to conclude that one possible factor underlying bilinguals’ 
ToM performance could be cognitive control. Javor (2016) also provided evidence of existing 
differences between bilingual and monolingual adults’ ToM performance. Bilingual and 
monolingual adults completed a Hungarian version of the ToM short stories test (Dodell-Feder, 
Lincoln, Coulson, & Hooker, 2013) that requires participants to read several stories and indicate 
whether socially awkward or inappropriate situations occurred, as well as what the characters in 
the story felt, knew, and believed. Javor reported that, overall, bilingual participants 
outperformed monolinguals on accurate responses to the ToM test, suggesting that adult 
bilinguals might also outperform monolinguals in this test of ToM. Finally, Navarro and Conway 
(2021) found that bilingual adults outperformed monolinguals in responses to trials that required 
taking the perspective of another person and inhibiting their own perspective (i.e., director task). 
Overall, these findings suggest that bilingualism is associated with individuals’ ability to take 
into account the perspective of another person, nevertheless it is unclear whether the processes 
involved in this advantage are the same processes found among children populations. 
Given that bilingual children might use metalinguistic awareness (Buac & Kaushanskaya, 
2019; Diaz & Farrar, 2017) to determine that others’ perspectives differ from their own earlier 
than monolinguals, perhaps bilingual adults also engage different processes than their 
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monolingual peers to support ToM. This would indicate that ToM is more flexible than 
previously considered and that the use of a specific process (e.g., metalinguistic awareness) 
during childhood can carry over into adulthood. Examining this possibility would elucidate the 
extent to which ToM can be accounted for by the Competence and Performance frameworks as 
well as understanding the extent to which individual differences influence ToM. 
6. Interim Summary 
Theory of Mind (ToM) has been studied empirically for over 30 years, leading to a 
number of robust findings, including the age at which children begin showing belief 
understanding, the psychological disorders associated with impaired ToM, the relationship 
between ToM, language ability, and executive function, and the behaviors associated with ToM 
performance in adulthood. However, a number of methodological issues have recently arisen in 
the way ToM is conceptualized and measured (e.g., Quesque & Rossetti, 2020), suggesting that 
there could be deep issues in the construct validity of ToM tasks. In addition, there is still 
controversy about the processes that affect, intervene, and are engaged when using ToM, and 
little is known about how these processes can be affected or changed by individual differences, 
such as growing up bilingual. 
This dissertation will focus on two areas that can contribute to better understanding ToM 
and ToM-related processes. First, the psychometric properties of the tasks will be examined. This 
is important (a) to ensure that ToM measures are assessing the two key criteria of ToM ability, 
that is, the mentalizing criterion and the nonemerging criterion (Quesque & Rossetti, 2020), and 
(b) to ensure that ToM tasks are not measuring other related but different constructs, such as 
fluid and crystallized intelligence. To do this, factor analysis and network modeling will be used 
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to assess whether ToM measures adequately represent a ToM construct, and to revise, maintain, 
or abandon measures that do not clearly assess ToM.  
Second, individual differences in ToM performance will be examined to explore the 
processes underlying ToM. To this end, ToM performance and the processes that predict ToM 
performance will be studied among adult bilingual and monolingual populations. This will add to 
existing theories within both the Performance and Competence frameworks. Specifically, if 
bilinguals show that metalinguistic awareness (in addition to EF) can be used to predict ToM 
performance for the bilingual group, this would suggest that experience plays a role in the 
performance of ToM (supporting the Competence framework). Simultaneously, if monolinguals 
largely use EF, but not metalinguistic awareness, to engage ToM, then it would suggest that EF 
is also necessary for ToM performance. In other words, studying bilinguals could bridge both 
existing theoretical frameworks by showing the extent to which both frameworks can explain 
performance based on individual differences. Addressing both of these issues is a crucial step to 
further the field of ToM and to understand how humans decipher what other people think and 
believe. 
II. Study 1: Psychometric Analysis of Theory of Mind Tasks 
The goal of Study 1 is to examine the validity of ToM tasks by comparing performance 
on these tasks to measures of fluid intelligence (Gf) and crystallized intelligence (Gc) (Cattell, 
1963). As mentioned, Gf and Gc are reliable constructs that predict a number of real-life 
outcomes and that represent related but different psychological attributes. Examining the 
differences between these constructs and ToM would allow us to explore whether the processes 
tapped by ToM tasks represent a unique ToM construct, or whether they instead measure other 
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related constructs. Recent research has reported that some measures of ToM reveal low inter-task 
correlations (Warnell & Redcay, 2019), suggesting that different tasks do not measure the same 
higher-order construct, but rather reflect task-specific processes (Quesque & Rossetti, 2020). For 
example, some ToM tasks require reading ability (e.g., Short Stories Questionnaire), while others 
require solving novel problems (e.g., Director Task). For this reason, it is necessary to 
understand whether these diverse tasks adequately assess the same underlying construct or 
whether they are actually measuring other abilities, such as Gf and Gc. For this purpose, 
participants completed a battery of ToM, Gc, and Gf tasks. If ToM tasks represent a distinct 
cognitive ability, then a three-factor model should best fit the data. 
In addition, a psychometric network modeling analysis was conducted to examine the 
relationship among ToM, Gc, and Gf tasks. Psychometric network modeling conceptualizes 
cognitive abilities as interconnected networks composed of interactive processes (see Epskamp 
& Fried, 2018). This approach has many benefits. Specifically, psychometric networks are a 
powerful visualization tool to explore anticipated or unknown relationships amongst variables in 
a dataset and, unlike latent variable modeling, they are not constrained by the principle of local 
independence (i.e., the assumption that a latent factor causes any and all covariation among 
measures of the same construct). In addition, network modeling can account for the one-to-one 
relationships amongst tasks belonging to the same construct while at the same time estimating 
individual relationships between tasks belonging to different constructs. Finally, network 
modeling can estimate and plot associations between all observed variables, allowing 
investigators to describe and model current theories of ToM. 
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iii. Method 
d. Design and Participants 
 An online sample of 208 participants was recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk). The number of participants is based on the minimum sample size required for a three-
factor Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA; Wolf, Harrington, Clark, & Miller, 2013). The 
inclusion criteria for the study were that all participants had to be based in the US and were over 
18. Their ages ranged from 18 to 69 years old (M = 39.89; SD = 9.34, Median = 39). 116 
participants identified as female. In terms of ethnicity, 148 participants identified as Caucasian, 
13 identified as Black/African, 9 identified as Asian, 3 identified as Hispanic/Latino, and 7 
identified as mixed ethnicity. None reported being color blind. In addition, all participants 
reported having correct-to-normal vision and were fluent in English. Only one person reported 
that English was not their native language. 13 participants reported speaking a language in 
addition to English fluently. The final sample size after outliers were removed was N = 2032. 
The design of the study was a correlational approach using two different psychometric 
modeling techniques. To conduct factor analyses, it is recommended that each latent construct 
includes at least three tasks. In this study, participants completed 9 tasks in total: 3 tasks of ToM, 
3 tasks of Gf, and 3 tasks of Gc. Participants were randomly assigned to complete the tasks in 
one of three different orders. In order 1 (n =74), participants first completed the Gf tasks (Letter 
series, Number series, Ravens), followed by the Gc tasks (Synonyms, Antonyms, and General 
Knowledge) and by the ToM tasks (Director Task, RMET, SSQ). In order 2 (n = 58), participants 
 
2 Outliers are defined in the Data Cleaning section. 
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first completed the ToM tasks followed by the Gf and Gc tasks. In order 3 (n = 76), participants 
first completed the Gc tasks followed by the ToM and Gf tasks. 
e. Measures 
Theory of Mind Tasks 
Reliability for all tasks was calculated using Cronbach’s alpha. Three ToM tasks were 
used to assess the ToM construct. Even though traditional studies assume that ToM tasks tap into 
the same ToM construct, Warnell and Redcay (2019) found that the tasks vary substantially, 
even in terms of face validity. Therefore, it is important to investigate their construct validity. 
The ToM measures that were used in the study involve (a) taking the perspective of another 
person (i.e., Director task), (b) inferring mental states from people’s eyes (i.e., Reading the Mind 
in the Eyes), and (c) interpreting socially inappropriate situations (Short Stories Questionnaire). 
See Appendices A-B for a sample of ToM tasks. 
Director Task (Dumontheil, Apperly, and Blakemore, 2010; Legg, E. W., Olivier, L., 
Samuel, S., Lurz, R., & Clayton, N. S., 2017). The task was proposed by Keysar, Lin, and Barr 
(2003) and automated by Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010. The current version was an 
automated version adapted from Legg et al. (2017) and run on Qualtrics. The task includes two 
conditions (Director, No Director) and 2 trial types (Experimental, Control). The stimuli are set 
up in a 4x4 shelf containing eight different objects arranged in different positions. In the Director 
Condition, an avatar called the Director is placed behind the shelf. Some of the compartments in 
the shelf are occluded from the Director’s view so that only the participant can see those objects. 
The Director stands on the other side of the shelf and views the shelf from behind, so that only 
the objects in the open compartments are visible to the Director. The participant is then asked to 
attend to the instructions that the Director gives her in a speech box. On each trial, the Director 
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asks the participant to select one of the objects in the shelf (e.g., “the yellow sock”, “the small 
cup”). The participant responds by clicking on the correct object within the shelf. Participants 
have 5 seconds to respond to each instruction. Average accuracy and reaction times for all trials 
was recorded. 
Conditions. In the Director condition, participants were asked to consider the perspective 
of the Director. To this end, participants were shown the shelf from the perspective of the 
director and were explicitly told that the Director cannot see objects in the occluded 
compartments. This condition assesses theory of mind because the participant has to remember 
that the perspective of the Director is not the same as theirs. In the No Director condition, 
participants are shown the same shelf, but the Director is not behind it anymore. Instead, 
participants are given a strategy; participants are told to ignore all objects placed in the slots with 
red backgrounds. This condition does not require theory of mind and instead requires the 
participant to inhibit prepotent information while keeping in mind a rule, therefore just requiring 
general executive function. The No Director condition is used as a control condition. 
Trial types. Experimental trials are trials where the participant have to take into account 
the perspective of the Director. Participants have to select the correct response (i.e., the target), 
which is an object in the grid that both the participant and the director can see (the tennis ball in 
Appendix A), however in experimental trials the shelf also shows a competing object that can be 
the most appropriate response but only from the perspective of the participant (the golf ball in 
Appendix A-C). To respond correctly, participants have to consider the Director’s perspective 
and avoid clicking on the competing object that is only visible to them. In Control trials, the 
target object has a competitor but is always the best response from both perspectives and no 
competing object is included in one of the grey compartments (see Appendix A-C). Filler trials 
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referred to objects in the shelf that have no competitor and are visible to both Director and 
participant. The No Director condition included the same three type of trials. Different shelf 
displays or stimuli were created for the study. Each stimulus included three instructions, one of 
which was either an experimental or control, and two of them were filler trials. Experimental and 
control trials are never shown in the same stimulus. Control and experimental trials appear in a 
pseudorandom intermixed order throughout the task and the order of presentation of the stimuli 
is counterbalanced across participants. There are three written instructions per stimulus that were 
presented on a speech bubble near de Director (in the Director condition) or on the top right side 
of the shelf (in the No Director condition). Participants respond to a total of 16 control trials, 16 
experimental trials and 64 filler trials in each condition. Participants also complete a practice 
trials before the Director condition. 
Reading the Eyes in the Mind (RMET; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & 
Plumb, 2001).  The original paper based RMET task was programmed on Qualtrics. In the task, 
participants are presented with a series of 36 black and white photographs of the eye region of 
the face of White females and males of different ages (see Appendix B). One photograph is 
presented at a time and participants have no time limit to respond. Four words describing the 
potential emotion conveyed by the eyes are presented together with the photograph. Participants 
must select the word that best describes what the person in the photograph is feeling (e.g., sad, 
happy, scared, depressed). The test is thought to assess how well a person can understand other 
people’s mental states. RMET scores range from 0 to 36 in a discrete fashion. Accuracy is 
measured in this task. The task lasts approximately 10 minutes.  
Short Stories Questionnaire (SSQ; Dodell-Feder, Lincoln, Coulson, & Hooker, 2013; 
Lawson, Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2004). SSQ was implemented on Qualtrics. The test 
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contains 10 short stories, each divided into three sections. The stories involve utterances made by 
a character that could upset another character in the story (e.g., by incorrectly assuming 
someone’s age). In this task, participants must infer the mental states of the characters (i.e., how 
they felt, what they thought). Because each story is divided into three sections, there are a total of 
30 sections overall with at least four utterances in each section. 10 sections contained blatant 
target utterances (e.g., incorrectly estimating that a woman’s age), 10 contained subtle target 
utterances (e.g., lying about remembering someone’s name) and 10 contained filler control 
utterances (e.g., discussing the weather). Each section contained a corresponding question. The 
question asked the participant whether something said in the story could have upset someone. 
Participants had to judge whether the section contained an upsetting utterance and indicate what 
part of the text corresponded to the upsetting utterance. Each of the 10 stories included a filler 
question (i.e., a story that did not contain an upsetting question). The order of presentation of the 
stories is random. Participants are scored based on the number of targets identified. There are 10 
stories, with three parts each and two of the three parts included either a blatant or subtle target 
utterance, resulting in 20 possible correct responses. Accuracy is measured in this task. Scores 
range from 0 to 20 in a discrete fashion. The task lasts approximately 15 minutes. 
Fluid Intelligence Tasks 
All fluid intelligence tasks were programmed in Qualtrics. The tasks are thought to 
measure the ability to follow rules and solve novel problems.  
 Letter Series (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976). In the task, ten sets of 
four letters are presented. All sets present 5 series of letters that followed a certain pattern except 
for one set. To respond correctly, participants must select the letter set that does not follow the 
pattern. Accuracy is measured in this task. The task automatically ends after 5 minutes. 
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 Number Series (Thurstone, 1938). In the task, ten trials are presented showing a series 
of numbers of varying lengths in it. Each series of numbers is organized following a specific 
order or pattern. Participants are asked to select the number that would be consistent with the 
series from five choices. Accuracy is measured in this task. The task automatically ends after 5 
minutes. 
 Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1938). A short version of Raven’s figural 
inductive reasoning task was used to measure fluid intelligence. All items are divided into the 
even or odd items for a total 18 items per task from the Raven’s Progressive Matrices Set II 
(Hamel & Schmittmann, 2006). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two task orders 
(odd trials or even trials). In this task, each item is part of a pattern of eight black and white 
figures arranged in a 3x3 matrix in which the last bottom right figure is missing. At the bottom of 
the matrix is a list of eight possible figures to choose from. Only one of those figures is the 
correct answer that best completes the pattern of the missing piece in the matrix. Figures range 
from simpler geometrical shapes to complex patterns. In each item there are a series of rules that 
the participant needs to find and keep in mind to find the right answer. Participants were given 
three practice trials before completing the task. A standardized score of correct responses is 
calculated. The task ends automatically after 15 minutes. 
Crystallized Intelligence tasks 
The crystallized intelligence tasks are programmed in Qualtrics. All tasks are thought to measure 
previously acquired knowledge. 
 Synonyms. The synonyms test presented participants with 10 words shown one at a time 
each with a list of possible answer choices. Participants had to choose the word whose meaning 
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was the same as the initial word displayed on the screen. Accuracy is measured in this task. 
Participants had 5 minutes to answer all 10 questions. 
 Antonyms. The antonyms test is identical to the Synonyms test, except that participants 
have to choose from the list of options the word that represents the opposite meaning to the word 
displayed. Accuracy is measured in this task. Participants have 5 minutes to answer all 10 
questions. 
 General Knowledge. The general knowledge test consisted of 10 questions regarding 
general knowledge (e.g., “What planet is furthest from the sun?”). Participants have to type out 
their answers to respond and are asked to enter “I don’t know” if they do not know the answer. 
Accuracy is measured in this task. Participants have 5 minutes to answer all questions. 
f. Procedure 
 All tasks were administered via Qualtrics and participants accessed the study from 
Amazon’s MTurk. Participants were assigned to one of three counterbalanced orders following 
an unbalanced Latin square design. Each order was counterbalanced based on the construct that 
the tasks measure (i.e., Gf, Gc, and ToM). That is, participants were randomly assigned to first 
complete the tasks of one of the three constructs, then completed the tasks of the second 
construct, and finally the tasks of the third construct., in a counterbalanced order. Tasks within 
each construct were presented always in the same order. Participants were allowed breaks in 
between tasks. Completing the battery of tasks takes approximately 90 minutes. Participants 
were compensated with $15. 
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iv. Results 
Descriptive statistics for each measure and reliability estimates are presented in Table 1.  
Cronbach’s alpha, a measure of scale reliability, was used to measure the internal consistency of 
the tasks in this study. All measures demonstrated adequate reliability according to Cronbach’s 
alpha (i.e., 𝛼 ≥ .60). In terms of the relationships among tasks, bivariate correlations between 
measures are reported in Table 2. As previous research has shown (Coyle et al., 2018; Warnell & 
Redcay, 2019), correlations among ToM tasks were low and all were more correlated with 
measures of Gf than with each other. In terms of Gc and Gf, the measures were overall 
moderately or strongly correlated. Letter series, number series and Ravens all presented 
correlations over r = .30 among themselves; general knowledge, synonyms, and antonyms were 
strongly correlated r > .40. Gc and Gf measures were also correlated as expected based on 
models of intelligence. Overall, Gc and Gf measures seemed to correlate adequately within their 
respective constructs. However, the ToM measures presented less clustered correlations. For 
example, the director task and SSQ presented low but significant correlations with all tasks, not 
just with ToM tasks, and the RMET seemed strongly related to the Gf measures in particular. To 
better understand these relationships, we conducted confirmatory factor analyses. 
g. Data Cleaning 
Missing Data and Outliers. The data were screened for missing values and outliers. The 
analysis indicated that only .05% of the data was missing. The missing data were mainly due to a 
technical issue in the Letter Series task that resulted in the loss of 16 responses. Values for the 
missing data were imputed using a multiple imputation-chained equation technique (via the mice 
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package in R; Azur et al., 2011) that uses Bayesian regression-based linear prediction to impute 
all of the missing data points.  
Regarding outliers, univariate outliers were deemed negligible as the number of 
univariate outliers represented .04% of the data. Multivariate outliers were identified by 
generating Mahalanobis distance terms for each case (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). In total, 5 
cases were identified as having a Mahalanobis distance greater than the associated critical value, 
(e.g., 𝜒2(31) = 61.09) and were deleted list-wise. 
Normality. Univariate and multivariate normality were assessed by examining skewness 
and kurtosis values and conducting several tests designed to assess multivariate normality. Prior 
to data imputation, no measures in the original dataset demonstrated violations to univariate 
normality due to extreme values of skewness (more extreme than ±3.00) and kurtosis (more 
extreme than ±10.00), as presented in Table 1. However, the multivariate normality assumption 
was violated, based on various tests (e.g., Mardia, Henze-Zirkler, Royston, and Zhou-Shao; see 
Alpu & Yuksek, 2016; Zhou & Shao, 2014). Following data imputation, multivariate normality 
was still not demonstrated across the multivariate normality tests used (all ps < .05), indicating 
that the data were largely non-multivariate normal. For this reason, factor analyses were 
conducted using an estimator adequate for non-normal data (i.e., robust maximum likelihood).  
Homoscedasticity and Multicollinearity. Breusch-Pagan tests were conducted on the 
cleaned data, indicating that the residual variances were homoscedastic (SSQ: BP = 8.3853, df = 
6,p-value = 0.2112 RMET: BP = 8.684, df = 6, p-value = 0.1921; DT: BP = BP = 7.0446, df = 
6, p-value = 0.3167). Finally, for multicollinearity, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all of 
the variables were less than 5, indicating that the assumption has been maintained (James et al., 
2014).  
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h. Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Confirmatory factor analysis is a technique used to test and estimate relationships among 
observed and unobserved variables to construct a measurement model. The measurement model 
can be used to assess whether tests that assess a construct are consistent with the theoretical 
definition of the construct of interest. To examine whether a construct is adequately being 
measured, the fit of the model to the data can be tested. The measurement model tests whether 
the observed variance-covariance matrix is equal to the variance-covariance matrix implied by 
the model. To decide whether a model fits the data, multiple fit indices are observed. Fit indices 
consider the fit of the model relative to the saturated model (where all relations are specified) or 
the null model (where no relations are specified). According to Kline (2015), adequate models 
should have a chi-square to degrees of freedom ratio lower than 2, a Comparative Fit Index (CFI) 
greater or equal to .90, a Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) lower or equal to 
.08, and a Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) between .05 and .10 (Kline, 
2015). In addition, factor loadings should also be observed; cognitive tests tend to present 
loading values of between .30 and .60. When several models are being compared, model 
comparison indicates whether the models are significantly different, indicating that one of the 
models represents the data more adequately. 
In this study, CFA was used to assess the construct validity of the tasks by comparing 
model fit and loading paths. CFA requires the use of an estimation algorithm to compare iterated 
sets of values with the goal of minimizing the difference between the observed and the implied 
correlation matrix. Robust maximum likelihood is an adequate estimator for data that present 
multivariate nonnormality (Gibson & Ninness, 2005). Data from 203 participants were used. 
Three models were specified. The first model, Model 1, was a one-factor model where all 
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manifest variables were predicted by a single general construct. Model fit indices are in Table 3. 
Generally, Model 1 presented poor fit based on Kline’s fit indices described above, with no 
indices within standard ranges. While the fit indices presented a poor model, the standardized 
factor loadings were overall adequate, with only Raven’s Progressive Matrices presenting 
loadings under .30 (see Figure 2). This indicates that, as expected, a model with a single factor 
does not adequately represent the ability that the measures are thought to assess.  
Model 2 was conducted next to examine whether the ToM tasks would be better 
represented by a Gf factor compared to a separate factor. Model 2 was a two-factor model where 
Gf and Gc were the latent factors. The tasks corresponding to the traditional ToM and Gf 
constructs were combined in this model based on their bivariate correlations. The reasoning 
behind this was to understand whether ToM tasks really do represent an independent construct or 
if they are rather more related to tasks of fluid reasoning. Model 2 originally presented a 
Heywood case, indicating a misestimation of the model. To avoid this issue and understand 
whether the ToM tasks adequately loaded into the latent factor, a model with only Gf and Gc 
(i.e., the classical two-factor model) was estimated and the estimates for each variable were used 
to constrain the Gf and Gc variables in Model 2. This avoided the emergence of a Heywood case 
and provided a more adequate representation of the ToM measures. Fit indices for Model 2 are in 
Table 3. Overall, Model 2 did not present an excellent fit based on Kline’s fit indices, and no 
indices were within standard ranges, however some of the indices were close to excellent fit. 
Compared to Model 1, Model 2 presented better CFI, RMSEA, and chi-square to degrees of 
freedom ratio but slightly worse SRMR, while still outside the optimal range. Standardized 
factor loadings in Model 2 were adequate for the Gc and Gf factors, even though the ToM 
measures were loaded into the Gf factor. The correlation between Gf and Gc was strong, as it is 
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usually found (see Figure 3). These findings seem to indicate that although a two-factor solution 
was not a perfect fit for the data, nevertheless Model 2 seemed overall better than Model 1 and 
was not a complete misrepresentation of the data. Model comparison between Model 1 and 
Model 2 revealed that there was no significant difference between Model 1 and Model 2 (X2 = -
78.34, p = >.10). 
Finally, Model 3 was conducted to examine whether a theoretically-driven three-factor 
model provided a more adequate representation of the data. Model 3 was a three-factor model 
where each set of tasks was grouped under the psychological construct they represent 
theoretically. Just like for Model 2, Gf and Gc tasks were constrained to the estimates reported in 
the model with only Gf and Gc to avoid a Heywood case. Fit indices for Model 3 are in Table 3. 
Contrary to what was expected, Model 3 did not present an adequate fit to the data based on fit 
indices. In fact, Model 3’s fit indices were largely similar to those reported for Model 2, or 
slightly worse. Compare to Model 1, Model 3 overall presented overall a better fit. However, no 
indices were within adequate ranges. The factor loadings presented strong paths for Gf and Gc 
latent factors. However, the factor loadings for the ToM factor were poor (see Figure 4). None of 
them present loadings over .30 (see Figure 4). Model comparison between Model 2 and Model 3 
revealed that there was no significant difference between the models and there was also no 
significant difference between Model 3 and Model 1 (X2 = -75.19, p = >.10). One reason why the 
model presented poor fit might be due to the weak correlations among ToM tasks. Unlike the Gc 
and Gf tasks, the ToM tasks all presented poor loading paths and the correlations between the 
ToM factor and both the Gc and Gf factors showed correlations above 1, suggesting that perhaps 
the tasks in the ToM factor might have overlapping variance with some of the tasks in the other 
factors. This was further explored by examining modification indices (see Modified Model). 
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In general, none of the models presented excellent fit according to the fit indices. Overall, 
the two-factor model (in Figure 3) presented the most adequate indices, however there was no 
difference with the other models. Model 3 had slightly worse fit indices than the two-factor 
model but was not significantly different from Model 2.   
i. Exploratory factor analysis 
 Given the poor fit of the models, we decided to conduct an exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) to understand whether the data were indeed a good representation of the measurement 
model constructed in the CFAs. A parallel analysis was conducted to determine the number of 
factors that should be retained from the data. Parallel analysis is a method to determine the 
number of factors that the data form when conducting EFA. The analysis creates a random 
dataset with the same number of observations and variables as the original data and eigenvalues 
are computed for the randomly created dataset. Then, the randomly generated eigenvalues are 
compared to the observed eigenvalues. Because the random eigenvalues mostly represent 
random noise, only those factors that fall outside the random eigenvalues are considered real and 
are retained. The parallel analysis indicated that 2 factors should be retained (see Figure 5), 
rather than 3. This indicates that the third factor is likely so small that it is little more than 
random noise. However, to obtain a more interpretable EFA, we decided to follow the theoretical 
framework and extract three factors from the data, corresponding to the three psychological 
constructs.  Because the data were not normal, the chosen estimator was weighted least squares 
and the rotation estimator was Oblimin3, given the correlations among the variables. We 
 
3 Extraction techniques produce factors that are orthogonal and atheoretical. Rotation allows the 
transformation of the factor loadings, so they become more interpretable. Oblimin is an oblique (as opposed to 
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specified 3 factors in a factor analysis on all 9 measures. The results of the EFA are in Table 4. 
All variables with loadings greater than .30 were considered to load on a given factor. The results 
showed that all measures of Gc loaded adequately under the same factor. However, the Director 
task and RMET loaded under the Gf factor with the rest of the Gf measures, whereas the SSQ 
was almost entirely loading on the third factor by itself. These results suggest that in this sample, 
the ToM measures do not form a single construct, and the tasks seem to be measuring abilities 
closer to fluid reasoning, rather than a separate ToM construct. Given the results of the EFA, we 
decided to conduct an exploratory network model to better understand the relationships among 
measures. 
j. Network Model Analysis 
Exploratory Network Model Analysis (NMA) is an alternative analysis that 
conceptualizes cognitive abilities as interconnected networks composed of interactive processes 
(see Epskamp & Fried, 2018). In this technique, observed manifest variables are represented by 
nodes and estimated partial correlations amongst them are modeled via connections called edges. 
Therefore, this technique does not need the assumption of a superordinate unobservable factor. 
NMA can be used in conjunction or as an alternative to latent variable modeling and it presents a 
number of benefits. For example, because of its exploratory nature, NMA can be used as a 
powerful visualization tool to explore anticipated or unknown relationships amongst variables in 
a dataset. NMA is also not constrained by the principle of local independence. Unlike NMA, 
CFA is constrained by the principle of local independence. The principle of local independence 
 
orthogonal) extraction technique, therefore it allows the factors to be correlated (which is often the case in 
psychological studies). 
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assumes that a latent factor causes any and all covariation among measures of the same 
construct, and therefore CFA does not allow to observe the variance that manifest variables 
potentially have in common. Instead, NMA estimates associations between observed variables 
without assuming that a latent cause is responsible for any and all covariation among measures 
of the same construct. For this reason, NMA can account for one-to-one relationships among 
nodes belonging to the same construct while at the same time estimating individual relationships 
between nodes belonging to different constructs. Finally, NMA estimates associations between 
all observed variables, therefore it is ideal for modeling cognitive theories that propose 
overlapping processes among processes within the same construct. In addition, since NMA is an 
exploratory technique, it can be used on the same data as the CFA.  
In this study, NMA was used to examine whether tasks that assess ToM are adequately 
related to other ToM tasks and only slightly related to tasks that measure Gf and Gc. In addition, 
NMA was used to observe the relation between ToM tasks and Gf and Gc tasks to estimate the 
extent to which ToM relies on crystallized and fluid processes. For that purpose, tasks for all 
three constructs (i.e., ToM, Gf, and Gc) were included in the analysis and the parameters were 
set to the indices mentioned above. Data from the same 203 participants was used in this 
exploratory method. Based on the findings above and on previous research (Quesque & Rossetti, 
2020), it was predicted that ToM tasks that do not meet mentalizing and nonemerging criteria 
such as SSQ, would present weak edges and would be more dispersed than tasks that meet these 
criteria. In addition, it was predicted that tasks that share construct validity would be more 
closely related, independently of the construct they assess theoretically.  
NMA was conducted on the correlation matrix extracted from the dataset. The model was 
conducted and visualized using the qgraph package in R. The method and techniques used in this 
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study are consistent with recommendations from the network modeling tutorial written by 
Epskamp and Fried (2018). To conduct an NMA, two parameters must be set. Gamma is a 
hyperparameter that determines whether the model favors a more simple or complex structure 
per the number of estimated edges. Lambda is a tuning parameter that determines the 
rigorousness of removal of identified spurious edges that occur due to sample error. The NMA 
was generated using the graphical least absolute shrinkage and selector operator (gLASSO) 
regularization method to determine the level of network sparsity. Specifically, the extended BIC 
method was utilized, which produces simpler models, as gamma is automatically set to its most 
conservative setting (= .50). Consistent with Epskamp, Lunansky, Tio, and Borsboom (2018), 
lambda was be set to remove spurious (false-positive) edges while at the same time maintaining 
as many true edges as possible (i.e., .01). The settings used for the network model are designed 
to facilitate high-specificity during the estimation process, and high-sensitivity regarding 
network edge-pruning.  
Figure 6 shows the results of the network model. First, both Gf and Gc measures show 
strong partial correlations and form two closely related but independent constructs. One of the 
tasks, Raven’s, seems to have an especially central position in regard to the correlations among 
all three psychological constructs. While the Gf and Gc cluster together, the ToM tasks do not 
seem to represent a strong unified cluster. Even though the ToM tasks seemed to form a 
relatively solid construct in the CFA, in the NM they are visually less related to each other than 
the tasks that form the other constructs. In fact, they seem more related to other non-ToM tasks. 
Specifically, SSQ is slightly more related (.17) to Raven’s Progressive Matrices than it is to 
either of the other ToM tasks (.1 and .06, respectively). In addition, the Director task and the 
RMET do not share any significant edges with each other, despite loading adequately on the 
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ToM latent factor in the CFA and on the EFA, suggesting that the relationship between the two 
measures that were observed in the EFA might be due to their relationship with Raven’s. In 
addition, RMET seems to be more closely related to all the Gf tasks than to any other task, 
clustering with the Gf construct, rather than with the ToM construct, following the findings of 
the EFA. Overall, the ToM tasks do not seem to form a uniform construct separate from Gf and 
Gc, and rather seem to share processes with the tasks belonging to the other constructs than with 
each other. 
In general, the results of the NMA show that these three ToM tasks are not as strongly 
related to each other as previously thought, thus questioning the overall construct that these 
measures assess. In addition, these findings replicate recent findings suggesting that there is little 
coherence among ToM tasks (Warnell & Redcay, 2019). Although the ToM tasks used in this 
study might be tapping on to some dimension of a ToM construct, these findings suggest that 
there are clear differences in the processes the tasks are assessing and that they are possibly 
measuring other cognitive abilities (such as Gf), rather than or in addition to just ToM. This 
indicates that more psychometric research is necessary to understand what tasks should be used 
to assess ToM in adults, but also to understand whether ToM should be interpreted as an 
independent monolithic construct, rather than a number of sub-constructs.  
k. Modified Model 
 In addition to the above results, an additional CFA was conducted to examine the reasons 
behind the lack of fit in Model 3. For this purpose, modification indices were observed. 
Modification indices are estimates of the amount by which the chi-square value of a given model 
would be reduced, and therefore fit increased, if a specific parameter were modified in the 
model. That is, modification indices allow researchers to understand the ways in which the 
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model fit could improve based on a data-driven approach. Because of this, it is not advisable to 
use modification indices to specify a model a priori, but rather to examine potential issues in the 
existing model a posteriori. 
 To better understand the issues behind the misfit of Model 3, modification indices were 
observed. As it was also inferred from the EFA and NMA, the modification indices suggested 
that the fit of the model would improve if the RMET would be predicted by both Gf and ToM. 
These two modifications would considerably improve the fit of the model (see Figure 7). These 
modifications also improved the manifest variables loadings of the ToM latent factor, suggesting 
that the RMET is contributing variance to both constructs and therefore its use as a measure of 
purely ToM is dubious. 
v. Discussion 
The goal of Study 1 was to explore the psychometric properties of ToM tasks compared 
to fluid intelligence (Gf) and crystallized intelligence (Gc) (Cattell, 1963). As previous research 
has indicated, the ToM measures were poorly correlated (Warnell & Redcay, 2019), but 
presented adequate reliability. The CFA showed that none of the measurement models presented 
excellent fit. Specifically, Model 2 (the two-factor model with a Gf-ToM latent factor and a Gc 
latent factor) presented similar or better fit indices and path loadings than Model 3 (the model 
with Gf, Gc, and ToM), however they were not significantly different. These findings suggest 
that the tasks used to measure ToM might be more related to Gf tasks than to each other. In fact, 
the modified CFA model showed that the RMET shares processes with Gf and that a model 
where RMET was predicted by the ToM and Gf factors improved model fit. This was further 
confirmed by the exploratory factor analysis (EFA) in which the RMET and the Director task 
loaded under the Gf factor, whereas the SSQ loaded separately, indicating that the ToM tasks 
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tested here do not represent a unified construct. Finally, the NMA presented a visual description 
of the tasks. Specifically, the network model showed that measures of the well-established Gc 
and Gf constructs presented strong edges among the corresponding tasks (with weaker edges 
among the Gc tasks, representing the constructs’ relationship) and overall clustered together. 
However, the edges of the ToM measures were weak, and the nodes were spatially closer to the 
Gf tasks (especially Raven’s), than to each other. Specifically, the RMET seemed related to all 
Gf tasks but only presented a weak edge with the SSQ, and no edge with the director task. 
Similarly, the director task shared weak edges with measures of Gc and with the SSQ but not 
with the RMET, whereas SSQ presented weak edges with both ToM tasks and with Raven’s. 
Overall, these findings suggest that in this sample of neurotypical adults, three of the most 
popular measures of ToM do not seem to reliably measure the same underlying construct. 
III. Study 2: Examination of Processes that Predict ToM 
Performance 
The goal of Study 2 was to compare ToM performance in bilingual and monolingual 
adults to test if the processes underlying ToM vary between groups. This study has potential to 
inform existing theories within both the Performance and Competence frameworks of ToM. 
Specifically, if bilinguals show that metalinguistic awareness (in addition to EF) is used to 
perform ToM tasks, this could suggest that experience-related processes play a role in the 
development of ToM (Competence framework). Similarly, if monolinguals largely rely on EF, 
with little to no influence of metalinguistic awareness, to complete ToM tasks, then it would 
suggest that, in addition to experience, EF is a key predictor of ToM performance. In other 
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words, studying bilinguals could bridge both existing theoretical frameworks by showing the 
extent to which both frameworks can explain ToM performance based on individual differences. 
vi. Method 
l. Design and Participants 
An online sample of 186 participants was recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk), 80 bilinguals and 106 monolinguals. The inclusion criteria for bilingual participants 
were that they were Spanish-English bilinguals, that they learned and used both of their 
languages before age 10, and that at the time of this study, they used both languages on a daily or 
weekly basis. The inclusion criteria for monolingual participants were that they only know 
English at a native level and have little knowledge of a second language. The total number of 
participants recruited was based on an a priori power analysis conducted in G*Power to 
determine the minimum sample size needed for a multiple regression analysis to have a 90% 
chance of detecting an increase in R2 for a fixed model. The analysis indicated that a minimum 
of N = 202 participants (n=100) is needed for the study. All participants were based in the US. 
The monolingual group had a mean age of 37.52 (SD = 8.75, Median = 36.5) and the bilinguals 
had a mean age of 39.62 (SD = 12.75, Median = 37). 49 monolinguals and 38 bilinguals 
identified as female. None reported being color blind and all participants reported having correct-
to-normal vision. All other demographic information is in Table 5a. The final sample size after 
outliers were removed4 was N = 154, with 92 monolinguals and 62 bilinguals. The study is a 
correlational design where all participants completed a ToM task, an executive function task, and 
 
4 Outliers were determined based on the analyses conducted in the Data cleaning setion. 
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a metalinguistic awareness task composed of two subtests. In addition, all participants completed 
a survey including questions about their language use, culture(s) they identified with, and code-
switching habits, among other demographic information (see Tables 5a-5f). Participants were 
compensated $10. 
m. Measures 
Theory of Mind 
Due to the existing discussion regarding the validity of ToM measures (Quesque & 
Rossetti, 2020), in Study 2 the Director task was selected to assess ToM, as it is considered to 
assess both the mentalizing and nonemerging aspects of ToM (Quesque & Rossetti, 2020). In 
addition, the Director task was the only task that diverged from the Gf and Gc constructs in 
Study 1. The Director task is also thought to assess the perspective-taking component of ToM, 
rather than perceptual or emotional dimensions of ToM. This perspective-taking dimension has 
also been largely studied in adult non-clinical populations (e.g., Dumontheil, Küster, Apperly, & 
Blakemore, 2010; Ferguson & Cane, 2017; Pile, Haller, Hiu, & Lau, 2017; Samuel, Roehr-
Brackin, Jelbert, & Clayton, 2019). For this reason, the same Director task described in Study 1 
was used for Study 2. Task reliability was calculated by randomly splitting the observations in 
half and calculating Cronbach’s alpha for each half of the dataset. Overall, reliability measured 
by Cronbach’s alpha of internal consistency was 1.01. 
Metalinguistic Awareness 
Metalinguistic awareness was measured using the tasks developed by Cartwright et al. 
(2017) for adult samples. The tasks assess the contributions of metalinguistic awareness and 
cognitive flexibility. The two measures of metalinguistic awareness correspond to non-semantic 
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aspects of cognitive flexibility and are thought to assess the relative contributions of particular 
aspects of metalinguistic awareness and cognitive flexibility to differences between good and 
poor comprehenders. The overall reliability of the metalinguistic awareness measure was 
calculated using Cronbach’s alpha for both of the subtests. Overall reliability was .73. 
Graphophonemic awareness. The task consists of a 30-item Phoneme Counting 
Questionnaire in which participants have to count the phonemes in printed words (e.g., filth 
contains four phonemes). As mentioned above, Cronbach’s alpha is a scale of internal 
consistency among tasks. Standardized item reliability based on Cronbach’s alpha for this task 
was .87.  
Syntactic awareness. This task consists of a 10-item word order correction task in which 
participants must reorder sets of words into syntactically appropriate sentences. Multiple 
solutions are possible for each set of words (e.g., “the words dog is small the timid” could be 
reordered as “The timid dog is small” and “The small dog is timid”). Scores are the total number 
of appropriate sentences generated across the ten sets of words. Standardized item reliability 
based on Cronbach’s alpha reliability for this task was .87. 
Executive function 
Executive function allows the control of intentions and goals, while simultaneously 
avoiding interference. It is particularly relevant for a number of tasks, as it allows us to avoid 
automatic processes that create a conflict between a task and our own intentions. In Study 2, 
executive function was assessed with the Simon task.  
Simon task (von Bastian & Souza, 2016). In this version of the Simon task, participants 
were presented with a circle on either the right-hand side or the left-hand side of the screen. In 
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each trial, participants were presented a fixation crossed for 250 ms followed by the circle. 
Participants were asked to press the left arrow key when the circle is green and the right arrow 
key when the circle is red. Congruent trials are trials where the green circle appears in the left 
side and the red circle appears on the right side (75% of trials) and incongruent trials are trials 
where the green circle appears in the right side and red circles appear on the left side (25% of 
trials). To ensure sufficient inhibitory control demands, only 25% of trials were incongruent 
(Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979). Participants responded to 200 trials. Accuracy and reaction time 
responses were recorded. Task reliability was calculated by randomly splitting the observations 
in half and calculating Cronbach’s alpha for each half of the dataset. Overall alpha reliability was 
.97. 
Verbal Ability 
Semantic Verbal Fluency (Binetti et al., 1996). The same semantic verbal fluency task 
used in Study 1 was used to measure bilinguals’ and monolinguals’ verbal fluency. The task was 
modified for the bilingual group, so that it included four categories in Spanish in addition to the 
four categories in English (e.g., furniture, fruit, clothing, and animals). Presentation of categories 
was counterbalanced within each language and the order of language presentation was also be 
counterbalanced. Task reliability was calculated by randomly splitting the observations in half 
and calculating Cronbach’s alpha for each half of the dataset. Overall alpha reliability was 1.03. 
Bilingual Background  
Participants completed a survey regarding participants’ demographics, language history 
and use. The survey was composed of three well established questionnaires: Language 
Experience and Proficiency Questionnaire (Marian, Blumenfeld, & Kaushanskaya, 2007), the 
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Language and Social Background Questionnaire, and the Bilingual Switching Questionnaire 
(Rodriguez-Fornells et al., 2012). 
n. Procedure 
All tasks were administered via Qualtrics and participants had access to the study from 
Amazon’s MTurk. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four counterbalanced orders to 
complete the three tasks and the questionnaire. The questionnaire was always the last item to 
complete, whereas the other tasks were counterbalanced for both monolinguals and bilinguals. 
The entire study took between 50-60 minutes to complete. 
vii. Results 
Descriptive statistics for each measure and reliability estimates are presented in Table 6. The 
metalinguistic test demonstrated adequate internal consistency according to Cronbach’s alpha 
(i.e., 𝛼 ≥ .60). In terms of the relationships among tasks, bivariate correlations between measures 
are reported in Table 7. 
o. Data Cleaning 
Missing Data and Outliers. The data were screened for missing values and outliers. This 
analysis indicated that there was no missing data. Regarding outliers, multivariate outliers were 
given priority as they are of greater concern than the less complex univariate outliers. 
Multivariate outliers were identified by generating Mahalanobis distance terms for each case 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). In total, 14 cases were identified as having a Mahalanobis distance 
greater than the associated critical value, (e.g., 𝜒2(31) = 61.09) and were deleted list-wise. After 
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removal of the multivariate outliers, univariate outliers were deemed negligible as the number of 
univariate outliers represented .09% of the data. Thus, no other cases were removed. 
Normality. Univariate and multivariate normality were assessed by examining skewness 
and kurtosis values and conducting several tests designed to assess multivariate normality (see 
Figure 8). Prior to data imputation, no measures in the original dataset demonstrated violations to 
univariate normality due to extreme values of skewness (more extreme than ±3) and kurtosis 
(more extreme than ±10), as presented in Table 6. However, multivariate normality was not 
demonstrated based multivariate normality tests (e.g., Mardia, Henze-Zirkler, Royston, and 
Zhou-Shao; see Alpu & Yuksek, 2016; Zhou & Shao, 2014). Following data imputation, 
multivariate normality was still not demonstrated across the multivariate normality tests used (all 
ps < .05), indicating that the data were largely non-multivariate normal. 
Homoscedasticity and Multicollinearity. Breusch-Pagan tests were conducted on the 
cleaned data, indicating that the residual variances were not homoscedastic5 ( 𝐵𝑃 =
 30.255, 𝑑𝑓 =  4, 𝑝 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 = < .001). Finally, for multicollinearity, the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) for all of the variables were less than 5, indicating that the assumption was 
maintained (James et al., 2014). The violation of the homoscedasticity assumption was further 
examination by examining the histogram of the director task. The histogram revealed a bimodal 
distribution. For this reason, director task accuracy was divided using a median into a binary 
 
5 It is likely that the homoscedasticity assumption was violated due to a floor effect in responses to 
experimental trials from the bilingual group. As mentioned in the results section of Study 2, the data collected for 
the bilingual group were likely flawed due to reasons outside the design of the study.  
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variable. Therefore, a binary logistic regression was conducted to examine individual 
differences. 
p. Group-level analyses  
The main goal of the study was to examine individual differences in ToM between 
bilingual and monolingual adults. However, before conducting individual differences analyses, 
group-level analyses for each of the predictor variables were conducted to explore differences 
among the experimental conditions of each of the tasks as well as differences between bilinguals 
and monolinguals. Specifically, group-level analyses were conducted to ensure that the 
experimental manipulations in each task were successful. First, analyses were conducted to 
compare differences in accuracy based on trial type (experimental vs. control trials), condition 
(director vs. no director condition), and language group (bilingual vs. monolingual) in the 
director task with the goal of examining whether participants responded less accurately to critical 
trials in the director condition as well as whether there were differences by language group. 
Second, accuracy and reaction time were measured in the Simon task to explore whether there 
was a congruency effect (i.e., difference in responses based on congruent vs. incongruent trials) 
and whether responses varied by language group. Third, responses to both of the metalinguistic 
tests were compared for each language group to examine potential differences in accurate 
responses. Finally, responses to the Verbal Fluency tasks were analyzed to determine a) whether 
there were differences in verbal fluency in English for each language group and b) whether there 
were differences between English and Spanish verbal fluency for the bilingual participants. 
Director task 
Responses to the director task were examined to explore differences in responses between 
bilinguals and monolinguals for experimental compared to control trials for each condition. A 2 
 57 
(trial type: experimental, control) x 2 (language group: bilingual, monolingual) x 2 (condition: 
director, no director) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted on response accuracy. The three-
way interaction was not significant, F(1, 153) = .26, p = >.1, ηp2 = .100 (see Figure 9). However, 
there was a group by trial type interaction, F(1, 153) = 74.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .33; bilingual 
participants responded less accurately to experimental than control trials (bilingual: M = .23, SD 
= .35; monolingual: M = .74, SD = .37). There was also a significant condition by trial type 
interaction F(1, 153) = 39.46 p < .001, ηp2 = .21; participants responded less accurately to 
experimental compared to control trials in the Director but not in the No Director condition 
(bilingual: M = .45, SD = .43; monolingual: M = .61, SD = .44). These findings show that 
participants made fewer mistakes when they had to select items that both the participant and the 
director could see (i.e., control items) than when they had to select items that only the 
participant, but not the director, could see (i.e., experimental items). However, this only occurred 
when the participants completed the task in which they had to take the perspective of the director 
(i.e., Director condition) compared to when they merely had to follow a rule (i.e., No director 
condition). In addition, bilinguals seemed to largely underperform in experimental trials 
compared to control trials across both conditions, indicating that they largely responded 
inaccurately to items that the director could not see compared to monolinguals. 
 
Simon task 
Responses to the Simon task were examined to explore differences in responses between 
bilinguals and monolinguals for congruent compared to incongruent trials. To analyze responses 
to the Simon task (N = 154), the data were divided into two datasets based on reaction time and 
accuracy. Reaction time (RT) responses were filtered so that only correct responses were 
included. RT and accuracy each followed the same cleaning process described in the Method. 
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Both datasets were aggregated to obtain a mean RT and accuracy score per participant per 
condition (i.e., congruent, incongruent). Then, only participants with complete trials for both RT 
and accuracy were included. The total number of participants after this process was N = 144 for 
accuracy and N = 146 for RT. 
First, a 2 (trial type: congruent, incongruent) x 2 (language group: bilingual, monolingual) 
mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted on RTs (see Figure 10). The predicted interaction was 
not significant, F(1, 146) = .51, p > .10, ηp2 = .003. However, there was a significant main effect 
of group, F(1, 146) = 17.41, p < .001, ηp2 = .12; bilingual participants had longer RTs than 
monolinguals (bilingual: M = 733.41 s, SD = 269.97; monolingual: M = 575.40 s, SD = 154.85) 
(see Figure 10). In addition, as predicted, there was a significant main effect of trial type, F(1, 
146) = 133.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .48; participants had shorter RTs when responding to congruent 
than incongruent trials (incongruent: M = 658.76, SD = 221.74; congruent: M = 625.42, SD = 
227.23). 
Next, a 2 (trial type: congruent, incongruent) x 2 (language group: bilingual, monolingual) 
mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted on accuracy (see Figure 10). Again, the predicted 
significant interaction was not significant, F(1, 145) = .41, p > .10, ηp2 = .002. However, in the 
accuracy measure, there seemed to be a ceiling effect which might be responsible for the 
nonsignificant interaction. As predicted, there was a main effect of trial type, F(1, 145) = 9.48, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .39; participants were more accurate when responding to congruent than 
incongruent trials (incongruent: M = .94 SD = .05; congruent: M = .98, SD = .03). The main 
effect of group was not significant.  
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Overall, the results showed that there was a congruency effect; all participants were more 
accurate and had shorter RTs when responding to congruent trials compared to incongruent. In 
addition, bilinguals again underperformed in this task, presenting longer RTs than monolinguals. 
Metalinguistic task 
 Responses to the metalinguistic tasks were analyzed to examine differences in responses 
between bilinguals and monolinguals for each subtest. Analyses were conducted for each of the 
two metalinguistic subtests to examine any potential differences between bilinguals and 
monolinguals’ performance. For this, two t-tests were conducted on the Graphophonemic and 
Syntactic Awareness tests. For responses to the Graphophonemic task, Levene’s test showed that 
homogeneity of variance was not violated. An independent samples t-test indicated that there 
was a significant difference between responses of bilinguals and monolinguals, t(215.93) = -
5.82, p < .001, d = -.72. Specifically, monolinguals more accurately identified number of 
phonemes than bilinguals (bilinguals: M = 10.23, SD = 7.62, monolinguals: M = 15.32, SD = 
6.81) in the Graphophonemic test (Figure 11). Next, Levene’s test showed that homogeneity of 
variance was not violated in the Syntactic Awareness test either. Another independent samples t-
test was then conducted on the total number of correct responses to the Syntactic Awareness 
test6. There was a significant difference between responses of bilinguals and monolinguals, 
t(237.43) = -8.81, p < .001, d = -1.05. Specifically, monolinguals provided more grammatical 
sentences than bilinguals (bilinguals: M = 6.43, SD = 4.22, monolinguals: M = 10.86, SD = 
4.24) in the Syntactic Awareness test (Figure 11). Together, these results suggest that bilinguals 
largely underperformed in both tests of metalinguistic awareness. 
 
6 As a reminder, the Syntactic Awareness test was open-ended, that is, participants could create as many 
grammatically correct sentences as possible. The Graphophonemic test had a range of 0-30 correct responses. 
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Verbal Fluency 
 Verbal fluency was reported to assess whether there were implicit differences in verbal 
ability between bilinguals and monolinguals, as well as differences in Spanish and English in the 
bilingual group. Responses to the verbal fluency task were averaged and examined in two 
subsequent analyses. The first analysis compares average verbal fluency in English for both 
bilinguals and monolinguals and the second test examines verbal fluency in Spanish compared to 
English for the bilingual participants. For this, two separate t-tests were conducted. In the first t-
test comparing English verbal fluency of bilinguals to monolinguals, Levene’s test showed that 
homogeneity of variance was violated, therefore a Mann-Whitney U test for nonnormal 
independent samples was conducted. There was a significant difference such that monolinguals 
outperformed bilinguals in the average number of words provided, U = 4820, p < .001, d = -
1.05, indicating that monolinguals obtained a significantly higher score than bilinguals 
(monolinguals: M = 12.83, SD = 4.02, monolinguals: M = 8.23, SD = 5.23) in the English verbal 
fluency test (Figure 12). Next, another Levene’s test showed that homogeneity of variance was 
also violated when comparing verbal fluency in Spanish among bilinguals. Another Mann-
Whitney U test was conducted on the average verbal fluency score in English and Spanish. There 
was a significant difference between bilinguals’ responses in English and Spanish, U =9540, p < 
.001, d = .87. Specifically, bilinguals on average provided more correct words in English than in 
Spanish (English: M = 8.23, SD = 5.23, Spanish: M = 4.49, SD = 3.32) (Figure 12). These 
findings follow the same pattern of results reported for the other tasks above, suggesting that this 
group of bilinguals seems to have underperformed overall across all tasks. In addition, the 
finding that bilinguals had a substantially low score in Spanish and significantly lower than their 
 61 
English score suggests that this group of bilinguals was in reality not composed entirely of 
bilinguals. 
q. Individual differences analyses 
Individual differences were examined next. The main goal of Study 2 was to explore 
whether metalinguistic awareness and EF are predictors of ToM, as well as whether bilingualism 
moderates their effect on ToM. To test this prediction, regression analyses were conducted with 
EF, Metalinguistic Awareness, and Language Group (bilinguals vs. monolinguals) as predictors, 
and ToM as the outcome variable (see Table 8 for descriptive statistics). As mentioned above, 
the director task (i.e., outcome variable) had a bimodal distribution. Therefore, the data violated 
the normality assumption and the homoscedasticity assumption for a traditional multiple 
regression. For this reason, responses to the director task were divided using a median split and a 
binary outcome variable was created where participants who scored below or equal to the median 
(Median = .40625) were assigned a 0 (i.e., incorrect) and participants who scored above the 
median were assigned a 1 (i.e., correct). Therefore, a binary logistic regression was used to 
analyze the effect of EF, metalinguistic awareness, and bilingualism on ToM. Bivariate 
correlations (Table 7) showed that ToM was significantly negatively correlated with RTs in the 
Simon task (r = -.37) and positively correlated with both metalinguistics tests (r = .31 and .38, 
respectively), thus indicating that it was adequate to perform regression analyses. 
Three binary logistic regressions were conducted. To obtain a metalinguistic awareness 
score, the two metalinguistic tests were averaged and used as a metalinguistic awareness 
composite. Model 1 examined the effect of incongruent RTs in the Simon task and the 
metalinguistic composite as continuous variables, and Language group (bilinguals and 
monolinguals) as a categorical variable, on the two binary director task outcome. Model 2 was 
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identical to Model 1, but it also included the interaction between the Simon task and Language 
group and Model 3 was identical to Model 1 but including the interaction between the 
metalinguistic composite and Language group. Results for all models are reported in Table 8.  
The estimates of Model 1 show that all predictor variables (the Simon task, language 
group, and metalinguistic awareness) significantly predicted performance on the director task. As 
a reminder, in a binary logistic regression, the estimate B represents the logit (i.e., the log odds). 
To make this estimate interpretable, the odds ratios and the probability of obtaining a 1 in the 
director task (i.e., the probability of obtaining a score above the median) for each predictor 
variable are also reported. The probability estimates suggest that participants with higher 
metalinguistic score and slower RTs have about 50% probability of obtaining a 1 (i.e., obtaining 
a score above the median) in the director task, and monolinguals have a 90% probability of 
obtaining a 1 in the director task. This is in line with the group-level findings that show that 
bilinguals underperformed across all tasks in this study. As Models 2 and 3 show, there was not a 
significant interaction between the Simon task or the Metalinguistic composite and language 
group, suggesting that in this study responses to the director task were not moderated by 
bilingualism. Figure 13 presents the results of Models 2 and 3. 
The results of the individual differences analyses suggest that (a) bilinguals overall 
underperformed in the director task compared to monolinguals and (b) performance in the 
director task was overall predicted by performance in the Simon task and metalinguistic tests, as 
well as by being bilingual or monolingual. Specifically, slower RTs in the Simon task predicted 
more accurate performance in the director task, especially for monolinguals. In the metalinguistic 
awareness test, there was also a tendency for participants with higher metalinguistic scores to 
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also perform more accurately in the director task. These results are further discussed in the 
General Discussion. 
viii. Discussion 
The goal of Study 2 was to examine predictors of ToM performance in bilingual and 
monolingual adults. Specifically, whether metalinguistic awareness, EF, and bilingualism 
predicted ToM performance, as well as whether bilingualism moderated the effect of the other 
predictor variables on ToM. At the group-level, monolinguals largely outperformed bilinguals in 
all tasks. Importantly, bilinguals performed significantly worse in the verbal fluency task 
compared to monolinguals and bilinguals performed worse in the Spanish verbal fluency task 
than in the English verbal fluency task, suggesting that the participants in this sample were not 
bilinguals and might not have taken the study seriously. At the individual differences level, all 
EF, metalinguistic awareness, and bilingualism predicted ToM performance in this study. 
However, bilingualism did not significantly moderate the effect of either predictor variable. 
These findings are the first to suggest that that metalinguistic awareness and bilingualism are 
significant predictors of ToM. However, the disproportionate number of bilinguals who 
underperformed in this study suggests that there was a systematic problem with the bilingual 
sample recruited in this study. Given that data collection was conducted online, it is possible that 
the participants in the study were not in fact bilinguals or that they did not follow the instructions 
of the study, hindering the implications of the findings of Study 2. 
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IV. General Discussion 
7. Study 1: The need for psychometric research of ToM. 
 The goal of Study 1 was to examine the psychometric properties of ToM tasks compared 
to fluid intelligence (Gf) and crystallized intelligence (Gc) (Cattell, 1963). As previous research 
has shown, ToM measures were poorly correlated (Warnell & Redcay, 2019), nevertheless, they 
presented adequate reliability. The confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) showed that none of the 
models tested presented excellent fit. Specifically, the two-factor Model 2 (the model with a Gf-
ToM latent factor and a Gc latent factor only) presented better fit indices and loadings than the 
three-factor Model 3 (the model with Gf, Gc, and ToM latent factors), even though the two 
models were not significantly different. These findings suggest that the ToM tasks tested in this 
study might be more related to Gf than to a separate construct. This was further confirmed by the 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) in which the RMET and the Director task loaded under the GF 
factor whereas the SSQ loaded separately, suggesting measurement issues. In addition, the NMA 
presented a clearer picture of the relationships among the tasks. Specifically, the network model 
showed that, as opposed to the well-established Gc and Gf measures that presented strong edges 
and overall clustered together, the ToM measures were only poorly related and closer to the Gf 
tasks (especially Raven’s), than to each other. Overall, these findings suggest that, at least in this 
non-clinical population of adults, the most popular measures used to test ToM across the 
literature do not seem to reliably measure the same underlying construct. 
 Recently, the director task has been the subject of intense debate. Specifically, 
researchers have questioned whether it measures a specific dimension of ToM or rather some 
other cognitive processes, such as mental rotation or selective attention (Rubio-Fernandez, 
2017). In this study, the director task was poorly related to the other ToM constructs but 
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moderately correlated to the Gf and Gc tasks. It is unclear from this study whether the director 
task constitutes a better measure of a ToM construct than the other tasks measured in this study. 
It is possible that the director task represents a perspective-taking (cognitive), rather than social-
cognitive or social-perceptual dimension of ToM, thus correlating more strongly with fluid 
reasoning (especially, Raven’s progressive matrices that includes strong mental rotation and 
pattern seeking components). For example, research suggests that the SSQ is thought to be a 
social-cognitive measure whereas the RMET is thought to better capture social-perceptual ability 
(lower-order perceptual responses). Following this, it is possible that the director task represents 
yet another aspect of ToM. However, whereas the RMET and SSQ were moderately correlated, 
the director task presented poor correlations with the other two ToM tasks. This leaves 
unanswered the question of whether the director task represents a specific dimension of ToM that 
is only weakly related to other ToM dimensions, or whether instead the RMET and SSQ do not 
adequately capture ToM. Another possibility is that the director task does not necessarily 
measure a ToM-related ability but a different cognitive process. For example, Rubio-Fernandez 
(2017) has proposed that perhaps the director task could instead be measuring selective attention 
rather than solely ToM. Specifically, she proposes that the egocentric eye fixations often 
observed when participants see the critical items in the director task might not necessarily 
represent participants’ egocentric fixations, but rather that these eye fixations might indicate that 
participants are instead using selective attention to discard the inappropriate item that hinders the 
listener’s ability to carry out an action. This question is still unclear and requires further 
experimental research. 
 In general, these findings indicate that there are systematic issues around the 
conceptualization of ToM. Shaafsma et al. (2015) have pointed out that the use of ToM has been 
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“vague and inconsistent” across the literature and that there are deep inconsistences in the 
research, both related to the reliability of the measures and the claims made via the use of these 
measures in experimental designs. As discussed in the introduction, there are a number of 
different levels in which ToM is conceptualized and described, and different terminology is used 
to refer to the same construct; cognitive development, social cognition, self-understanding, 
perception of others, understanding logical inferences, emotion and/or empathy all seem to be 
included in the same umbrella term of ToM. However, it is unlikely that all these different 
aspects of cognition assess the same cognitive construct. As an example, in intelligence research, 
it is often thought that general intelligence encompasses a number of specialized sub-abilities 
(see Figure 14) whose positive correlations (i.e., positive manifold) represent a general 
intelligence construct. For each of these sub-abilities, a number of reliable tests (ideally at least 
three) are necessary to measure each sub-construct’s validly and reliably. It is possible that ToM 
can form a similar construct with different but related sub-abilities (as suggested by Quesque & 
Rossetti, 2020). However, for this to be explored, researchers should take a step back and 
develop reliable and valid tests of each proposed sub-ability that they consider forms a ToM 
ability. In addition, this should be further examined and described for the different populations in 
which ToM is studied: clinical and healthy, adults and children. Only by conducting this 
important psychometric work would we be able to reconcile developmental, clinical, cognitive 
and neurological research on ToM. 
8. Study 2: Individual Differences in ToM 
The goal of Study 2 was to examine any differences in the processes that predict ToM 
performance in bilingual and monolingual adults. Specifically, the goal of Study 2 was to assess 
(a) whether being bilingual moderated the effect of metalinguistic awareness on ToM, and (b) 
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whether being monolingual moderated the effect of EF on ToM. Overall, the initial hypothesis 
was not supported. Monolinguals outperformed bilinguals in all the tasks. In addition, whereas 
EF, metalinguistic awareness, and bilingualism all predicted ToM performance in the individual 
differences analyses, bilingualism did not significantly moderate the effect of any predictor 
variable. It is worth noting that there was a disproportionate number of bilinguals who 
underperformed in the ToM task as well as the verbal fluency task. In addition, bilinguals 
performed worse in the Spanish verbal fluency task than in the English verbal fluency task. This 
indicates that there was likely a systematic problem with the bilingual sample recruited in this 
study. Due to the lack of control of the participants who completed the study online, it is possible 
that the bilingual participants were largely not bilinguals. In the raw data of the bilingual group, 
there was number of unreliable responses and fake responses (i.e., bot-generated responses), 
suggesting that non-human participants might have infiltrated the study. These issues overall 
compromise the implications of the findings of Study 2. 
A positive outcome of this study is the high reliability observed among the metalinguistic 
tasks (Cartwright et al., 2017). There are not many metalinguistic tasks available for adult 
samples, therefore confirming the reliability of these tests allows for further research on the 
relationship of metalinguistic awareness and other cognitive abilities among adults. 
Metalinguistic awareness was also strongly correlated with executive function and performance 
in the director task in this study, suggesting that overall metalinguistic awareness is likely a 
relevant cognitive ability, even if it was not a moderating factor in this study. More studies 
examining individual differences in ToM should include a metalinguistic awareness task in 
addition to executive function measures. 
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Overall, Study 2 did not support the hypothesis that metalinguistic awareness is a 
stronger moderator than executive function in bilinguals compared to monolinguals. This 
provides support for the performance framework of ToM as opposed to the competence 
framework of ToM. Proponents of the performance view suggest that developing a more 
complex executive function alone is what allows children and, later, adults to successfully 
perform ToM tasks (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Bialystok & Senman, 2004; Leslie, 1994; Leslie, 
German, & Polizzi, 2005; Scholl & Leslie, 2001). Both metalinguistic awareness and EF are 
cognitive abilities that are developed in childhood and that improve throughout the lifespan, and 
both were significant predictors of ToM. This indicates that there are likely a number of 
cognitive abilities needed to complete ToM tasks and one’s individual ability in each of these 
tasks will affect performance in ToM. However, these findings should be interpreted with 
caution due to the issues mentioned above. 
Overall, Study 2 cannot shed light on the mechanisms that influence ToM performance. 
In addition to the issues related to the bilingual data, the implications of Study 1 suggest that it is 
necessary to understand what we are truly observing when we measure “ToM” before drawing 
inferences from experimental and correlational studies. The director task used in this study could 
represent perspective-taking, social-cognitive ability, selective attention, or just fluid reasoning. 
Given the low correlations among the ToM measures in general, tests and tasks should be better 
unified before examining individual differences in ToM if we want to have a better 
understanding of what influences this ability or abilities. 
9.  General Discussion 
 Overall, this dissertation poses a number of questions that warrant further study.   
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1. Is there one ToM or are there independent emotional, perceptual and/or cognitive processes 
underlying a ToM? Schaafsma et al. (2015) have posed the same question. The researchers raise 
the issue of what really constitutes an example of ToM. According to the researchers, the current 
conceptualization of ToM cannot be reduced to a number of basic processes and they wonder 
whether such a differentiated ability really exists: it “requires faith that there is indeed something 
distinctive about the core concept of ToM”. As the researchers point out, neurological research 
has proposed that there are computational features (i.e.., domain-general) as well as content-
specific features (i.e., domain-specific) that relate to people’s ability to understand desires, 
intentions, and beliefs. Content-specific features need to be inherently social whereas 
computational features refer to the specific differentiated processes involved in this ability, such 
as decoupling, recursion, prediction, and causal inference (Schaafsma et al., 2015). Further, 
Quesque and Rossetti (2020) have proposed that there are likely several separate mechanisms 
that have been crammed under the term ToM. Specifically, they propose that the long list of 
tasks used to measure ToM correspond to different processes. For example, the RMET might 
assess “Facial Expression Categorization”, the SSQ could be a task of “Mental States 
Ascription” and so on. To answer the question posed above, it is necessary that ToM measures 
reflect both general and specific computational processes used when one interprets desires, 
intentions, and beliefs in social contexts. Until this is achieved, it is not clear whether the field 
can move forward. 
2. Are there individual differences in ToM performance? Can different subcomponents of ToM 
vary across individuals? Given the many similarities and relationship between ToM and other 
cognitive abilities, it is likely that ToM varies across individuals based on different factors, and it 
is also likely that the level of one’s ToM ability can predict other life events. However, because 
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the formal conceptualization of the construct is so poor, it is not possible at this point to 
investigate such individual differences. While some research has looked into how ToM ability 
can vary across the lifespan (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010), it is not clear what 
these differences represent and whether they are accurate reflections of individual differences in 
ToM or, instead, of other related and/or overarching cognitive ability (e.g., EF). 
In essence, this dissertation leaves more questions than answers, clearly reflecting the 
unstable state of the area of ToM research. These questions emphasize the need for a paradigm 
shift in ToM research where the theoretical research conducted to date is re-examined, the 
measurement and psychometric research revisited and improved, and the field is unified by 
taking into account the number of processes that are unique, as well as similar, to other well-
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ix. Appendix A 
Director task (Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010). During the instructions phase, 
subjects were shown an example of their view (a) and the corresponding Director’s view (b) for a 
given trial. During the experiment phase, subjects could encounter experimental trials (c) or 
control trials (d). Participants had to follow the oral instruction given by the Director. In 
experimental trials (c), the participant should move the target item (tennis ball) and ignore the 
distractor item (golf ball) if they took account of the Director’s perspective. In control trials, an 




x. Appendix B 
Sample Reading the Eyes in the Mind (RMET). Participants view the eye region of different 











xi. Appendix C 
Sample section of the SSQ. Stories were adapted to American English and implemented in 









xii. Appendix D.  
Counterbalancing analyses for Study 1 and Study 2. 
Study 1 
Additional analyses were conducted to examine whether there were differences task 
performance based on the order in which the tasks were presented. As mentioned in the Method 
section, the tasks were administered in one of three random orders. Order 1 was the following: 
Gf tasks, Gc tasks, ToM tasks. Order 2 was: ToM, Gf, Gc. Order 3 was: Gc, ToM, Gf. To 
simplify counterbalancing analyses, only one task per construct (i.e., the first task of each set of 
three tasks presented) was tested. Therefore, three three-way ANOVAs were conducted to 
examine differences in responses to each task for each order.  
The first ANOVA compared accuracy in the Letter Series task of Gf across all three 
orders. There were no significant differences across orders (F (2, 200) = 1.63, p = >.10). The 
second ANOVA compared total responses to the Synonyms task of Gc across all three orders. 
There were no significant differences across orders (F (2, 200) = .73, p = >.10). The last 
ANOVA compared accuracy in experimental trials of the director task of ToM across order. 
There were no significant differences across orders (F (2, 200) = .20, p = >.10); the order in 
which participants completed the tasks did not affect performance in Study 1. 
Study 2 
Three additional analyses were conducted to examine whether there were differences in 
responses to the tasks based on the order in which the tasks were presented. As mentioned in the 
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Method section, the tasks were administered in one of four random orders. Order 1 was the 
following: director task, Simon task, verbal fluency, and metalinguistic tests. Order 2 was: 
Simon task, verbal fluency, metalinguistic tests, director task. Order 3 was: Verbal fluency, 
metalinguistic tests, director task, Simon task. Order 4 was: metalinguistic tests, director task, 
Simon task, verbal fluency. Four four-way ANOVA were conducted to examine differences in 
responses to each task for each order.  
 The first ANOVA compared accurate responses to the experimental trials of the director 
task across all four orders. The ANOVA reported a significant effect of Order (F (3, 311) = 5.71, 
p = .001). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that the significant differences were between 
Order 4 and Order 2 (p = .005) and Order 4 and Order 3.  (p = .001) indicating that participants 
performed more accurately when they were assigned to Order 4 compared to Orders 3 and 2. 
There were no other significant difference across orders for the director task. 
 The second ANOVA compared reaction times for incongruent trials of the Simon task 
across all four orders. The ANOVA reported a significant effect of Order (F (3, 152) = 3.52, p = 
.017). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that the significant difference was between Order 
2 and Order 1 (p = .016), indicating that participants performed more accurately when they were 
assigned to Order 2 compared to Orders 1. There were no other significant differences across 
orders for the Simon task. 
 The third and fourth ANOVA compared responses to the Graphophonemic and syntactic 
awareness tests, respectively.  The ANOVA for the Graphophonemic test showed a significant 
effect of Order (F (3, 311) = 12.31, p = < .001). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed that the 
significant difference was between Orders 3 and Order 1 (p = <.001), Order 4 and Order 2 (p = 
.002) and Order 4 and Order 3 (p = <.001). The ANOVA for the syntactic awareness test showed 
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a significant effect of Order (F (3, 311) = 3.58, p = < .014). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons 
showed that the significant difference was between Order 4 and Order 2 (p = .008). 
 The last ANOVA compared responses to the verbal fluency task in English across all 
orders. The ANOVA showed a significant effect of Order (F (3, 311) = 6.77, p = < .001). Post-
hoc pairwise comparisons showed that the significant difference was between Orders 2 and 
Order 1 (p = .014), Orders 3 and 1 (p = < .001), and Order 4 and 3 (p = .015).  
 Overall, the results of the counterbalancing analyses do not present a specific pattern of 
bias in one specific order, even though all ANOVA showed a significant difference in at least 




































9.28 3.84 -.89 -.78  
0-18 
.81 
2. Letter Series LS 203 6.77 2.59 .05 -.40 0-10 .77 
3. Number 
Series 








203 7.09 2.26 -.99 .34 0-10 .79 
5. Synonyms 
Task 
SYN 203 5.99 2.52 -.63 -.33 0-10 .86 
6. Antonyms 
Task 
ANT 203 6.16 2.15 -.48 -.68 0-10 .85 
7. Director Task DT Theory of 
Mind 
(ToM) 
203 .59 .39 -.48 -1.61 0-1 .66 
8. Reading the 




4.02 -.92 1.12 0-36 .72 




3.33 -.20 -.24 0-20 .72 
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b) Table 2. Correlations among variables. 
 





              
2. Synonyms .50 -             
3. Antonyms .43 .66 -           
4. Letter Series .17 .19 .18 -         
5. Ravens .52 .38 .44 .36 -       
6. Number series .39 .33 .34 .49 .56 -     
7. SSQ .18 .15 .15 .16 .33 .14 -   
8. RMET .33 .32 .32 .30 .41 .39 .24 - 
9. Director task .16 .16 .16 .18 .32 .27 .18 .17 
 













c) Table 3. Model Fit Indices for All CFA Models in Study 1. 
Note. It is common that the Network model presents excellent fit, nevertheless, because the network model is an 










Fit Indices χ2 df x2/ df CFI (TLI) RMSEA SRMR 
Recommended fit 
(Kline, 2015) 
  ≦2 ≧.90 ≦.08 .05 - .10 
Model 1: 
One predictor 
164.19 28 5.86 .73 (.65) .16 .149 
Model 2: 
GF + TOM 
95.51 32 2.98 .88 (.86) .09 .157 
Model 3: 
GF + GC + TOM 
108.31 31 3.49 .85 (.83) .11 .175 
Network model 21.46 11 1.95 .98(.92) .068 .033 
 98 
d) Table 4. Exploratory Factor Analysis Loadings for 3 factors. Tasks that loaded at >.30 were considered to 









Tasks Factor 1 - Gc Factor 2 - Gf Factor 3 - ToM 
1. Letter Series  .60  
2. Ravens  .55  
3. Number Series  .87  
4. Synonyms .82   
5. Antonyms .81   
6. General 
Knowledge 
.49   
7. Director Task  .31  
8. SSQ   .84 
9. RMET  .31  
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e) Table 5a. Demographic information for bilinguals and monolinguals. 
Note. Frequencies represent the number of participants who indicated a specific educational level or culture 
identification. Participants entered manually the culture or cultures they identified with. The maximum number of 
cultures reported were 3. 
 
 












Bilingual Doctorate 1 US-American 34 6 1 
 Master 36 Hispanic 4 9 3 
 Bachelor 33 Mexican 9 4 2 
 Some college, 
no degree 





1 2  
 High school 
or equivalent 
2 European 1   
   Catholic 3  7 
   Native-
American 
1   
   White/ 
Caucasian 
6 12 3 
   Other  3 2 
   Jewish  2 1 
   Non-Hispanic  2 1 
   Spanish  3 1 
Monolingual Master 9 US-American 81 4  
 Bachelor 34 Black/African 
American 
5 2  
 Some college, 
no degree 





8 1  
 High school 
or equivalent 
17 European 3 8 2 




2   
   Catholic 1   
   Hispanic  1 1 
   Other  2 2 
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 L1 L2 
English 81 2 
Spanish 1 63 
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g) Table 5c. Bilinguals’ reported age of acquisition (AOA) of each language and years living in a country 














Mean AOA L1 
(SD) 
Mean AOA L2 
(SD) 
Years in L1 country Years in L2 country  
1.64 (1.78) 5.21 (4.3) 32.21 (17.62) 23.29 (18.66) 
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English 49 54 50 57 51 61 59 
Spanish 17 19 32 23 35 29 28 
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 Friends Family Coworkers School Religious events Leisure 
L1 71.69 (21.07) 70.41(22.09) 69.59 (26.72) 70.79 (27.01) 63 (30.57) 71.09 (25.41) 
L2 50.89 (27.56) 54.02 (23.03) 49.2 (30.66) 48.17 (30.12) 48.85 (30.45) 51.05 (30.94) 
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Note. Task reliability for the metalinguistic awareness tests was calculated by extracting Cronbach’s alpha from the 







Variables Construct  
N 








62 10.26 7.54 .57 -.80 0-30 .87 
Syntactic 
awareness 
62 6.26 4.17 .92 .67 0-20 .87 
Verbal Fluency 
(English) 
Verbal Ability 62 8.30 5.02 .52 -.20 0-20 1 
Simon Task (RT) Executive 
Function 
62 729.15 269.64 1.51 2.13 382-1683 .97 
Director Task  
ToM 
 









92 15.32 6.81 -.52 -.37 0-30 .87 
Syntactic 
awareness 
92 10.86 4.24 .21 -.54 2-23 .87 
Verbal Fluency 
(English) 
Verbal Ability 92 12.95 3.91 -.22 .94 1-25 1 
Simon Task Executive 
Function 
92 575.40 154.85 1.98 5.05 373-1298 .97 
Director Task  
ToM 
 
92 .66 .33 -1.99 3.77 0-1 1 
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Variables 1 2 3 4 
1. Verbal Fluency     
2. Director Task .47    
3. Graphophonemic 
task 
.60 .50   
4. Syntactic Awareness 
task 
.52 .46 .54  
5. Simon task -.47 -.38 -.30 -.43 
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l) Table 8. Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Models 1-3, N=146).  
 
Note: *** <.001, ** <.01, *<.05, ᛭ <.1. P = probability. 
 
Model 1 
Variable B SE β Odds 
ratio 
P 
Simon task -.003 .001 -2.28* .996 .50 
Metalinguistic 
Composite 
.203 .051 4.03*** 1.25 .55 
Language Group 2.25 .528 4.27*** 9.51 .90 
Pseudo-R2 -.708 
Model 2 
Variable B SE β Odds 
ratio 
P 
Simon task -.002 .003 -1.27 .997 .499 
Metalinguistic 
Composite 
.21 .051 4.06*** 1.23 .551 
Language Group 3.68 2.15 1.71᛭ 39.74 .975 
Simon task x Group -.002 .003 -.69 .997 .499 
Pseudo-R2 -.714 
Model 3 
Variable B SE β Odds 
ratio 
P 
Simon task -.003 .001 -2.27* .996 .499 
Metalinguistic 
Composite 
.205 .081 2.50* 1.23 .551 
Language Group 2.28 1.38 1.66᛭ 9.84 .908 
Metalinguistic x 
Group 













b) Figure 2. Model 1: One-factor model. Standardized factor loadings are presented. All loadings were within 
adequate range (>.30) with the exception of Raven’s. ANT = Antonyms, SYN = Synonyms, GEN = 
General Knowledge, DT = Director task, SSQ = Short stories questionnaire, RME = Reading the eyes in 










c) Figure 3. Model 2: Two-factor model. Standardized factor loadings are presented. All loadings were within 
adequate range (>.30). ANT = Antonyms, SYN = Synonyms, GEN = General Knowledge, DT = Director 
task, SSQ = Short stories questionnaire, RME = Reading the eyes in the mind test, NUM = Number series, 










d) Figure 4. Model 3: Three-factor model. Standardized factor loadings are presented. Loadings were within 
adequate range for the Gc and Gf factors (>.30) but were low for the ToM factor (< .30). ANT = 
Antonyms, SYN = Synonyms, GEN = General Knowledge, DT = Director task, SSQ = Short stories 
questionnaire, RME = Reading the eyes in the mind test, NUM = Number series, LET = Letter series, RAV 




e) Figure 5. Parallel analysis. The black line represents the number of factors extracted from the dataset based 
on eigenvalues. The blue line represents the number of random factors retained from the random 
eigenvalues. The overlap of the blue and black line at factor 3 suggests that only factor 1 and 2 should be 







f) Figure 6. Network model. Nodes represent the tasks measured in the study. Edges represent the partial 






g) Figure 7. CFA model with modification indices (i.e., RMET is predicted by both ToM and Gf). ANT = 
Antonyms, SYN = Synonyms, GEN = General Knowledge, DT = Director task, SSQ = Short stories 
questionnaire, RME = Reading the eyes in the mind test, NUM = Number series, LET = Letter series, RAV 















i) Figure 9. Response accuracy to the Director task by language group, condition, and trial type. The three-
way interaction was not significant. There was a group by trial type interaction showing that monolinguals 




























j) Figure 10. Response times (ms) to the Simon task by trial type and accuracy (proportion correct) to the 



























k) Figure 11. Total responses to the Graphophonemic test (i.e., correctly identifying words’ phonemes) of 
Metalinguistic awareness by language group and total responses to the Syntactic Awareness test 



























l) Figure 12. Average Verbal Fluency score in English by group and Average Verbal Fluency score in 


























m) Figure 13. Models 1 and 2. Simon task and Metalinguistic awareness predicting the director task by group. 















n) Figure 14. Cattel-Horn-Carrol (CHC) model of general intelligence and it’s sub-abilities (McGrew, 2009). 
 
